THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
The State, Respondent,
Brandon Leandre Brown, Appellant.
Appeal From Florence County
J. Michael Baxley, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2004-UP-358
Submitted March 19, 2004 – Filed June 4, 2004
Senior Assistant Appellate Defender Wanda H. Haile of SC Office of Appellate Defense, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, Senior Assistant Attorney General Norman Mark Rapoport, all of Columbia; and Solicitor E.L. Clements, of Florence, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Brandon Leandre Brown appeals from his conviction and sentences for first-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor and for transmitting a sexual disease. 1
1. We find no error in the trial court’s refusal to direct a verdict of acquittal on the indictment charging Brown with transmitting a sexual disease. When reviewing the denial of a directed verdict motion, the court of appeals must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the State. State v. Morgan, 352 S.C. 359, 574 S.E.2d 203 (Ct. App. 2002). If there is any direct evidence or any substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, an appellate court must find the case was properly submitted to the jury. State v. Patterson, 337 S.C. 215, 522 S.E.2d 845 (Ct. App. 1999). The evidence supported the finding that the victim in this case contracted gonorrhea from Brown.
2. We need not address the issue of whether the trial court erred in admitting Brown’s second statement in evidence because the police did not repeat the Miranda warnings to Brown prior to his giving the statement. The issue is not preserved for appellate review because Brown never specifically raised the issue to the trial court and never received an explicit ruling upon it.2 See State v. Nichols, 325 S.C. 111, 120, 481 S.E.2d 118, 123 (1997) (“[An] exception is not preserved for review because appellant simply made a general objection during the experts’ testimony without giving the specific ground. An issue may not be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to the trial judge to be preserved for appellate review.”); see also Noisette v. Ismail, 304 S.C. 56, 403 S.E.2d 122 (1991) (holding that where the circuit court did not explicitly rule on an argument the issue was not properly before the court of appeals and should not have been addressed by it).
GOOLSBY, HOWARD, and BEATTY, JJ., concur.
1 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rules 215 and 220(b)(2), SCACR.
2 Although we do not address the issue of whether the interrogating officer should have repeated to Brown the Miranda warnings given him three hours and thirty-nine minutes before he gave the second statement, other courts have held that repeated warnings are not necessary to a finding that a defendant knowingly and intelligently waived them in similar instances. See United States v. Frankson, 83 F.3d 79 (4th Cir. 1996) (two and one-half hours); Jarrell v. Balkcom, 735 F.2d 1242 (11th Cir. 1984) (three hours); Commonwealth v. Silanskas, 746 N.E.2d 445 (Mass. 2001) (two hours); Bush v. State, 461 So. 2d 936 (Fla. 1984) (eleven hours); Fagan v. State, 412 So. 2d 1282 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982) (three and one-half hours). We also note that here the officer reminded Brown of his rights before obtaining a second statement from him and Brown appeared to have an understanding of his rights at that time. See State v. Smith, 259 S.C. 496, 192 S.E.2d 870 (1972) (wherein the supreme court held the question of whether Miranda warnings should be repeated at a later stage of interrogation after having been once given must be determined on the basis of the facts and circumstances surrounding each case).