THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Rodney T. Arnold, Appellant,
State of South Carolina, Respondent.
Appeal From Greenville County
Edward W. Miller, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2005-UP-066
Submitted January 1, 2005 – Filed January 25, 2005
Assistant Appellate Defender Robert M. Pachak, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott and Assistant Attorney General Christopher L. Newton, all of Columbia, for Respondents.
PER CURIAM: Rodney Arnold filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The trial court dismissed the petition, holding the allegations raised by Arnold could not be raised in a petition for habeas corpus since they were cognizable under the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act, S.C. Code Ann. §§ 17-27-10 to -160 (2003). Arnold argues on appeal he is entitled to seek relief through habeas corpus because he could not now raise the issues in post-conviction relief proceedings since he had already been through post-conviction relief proceedings and any future applications under the act would be treated as successive and since he would also be barred by the statute of limitations contained in the act. Arnold does not claim that the issues he now wishes to raise could not have been raised before in a post-conviction relief application. We affirm  pursuant to Rule 220(b)(2), SCACR and the following authorities: Gibson v. State, 329 S.C. 37, 42, 495 S.E.2d 426, 429 (1998) (holding the trial court could entertain a habeas corpus petition if, among other things, the applicant could show that “the issues raised now could not have been raised in their [sic] prior PCR applications”; Simpson v. State, 329 S.C. 43, 46, 495 S.E.2d 429, 431 (1998) (holding “a matter which is cognizable under the Act may not be raised by a petition for a writ of habeas corpus before the circuit or other lower courts”); Keeler v. Mauney, 330 S.C. 568, 571, 500 S.E.2d 123, 124 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding if “[a] person is procedurally barred from petitioning the circuit court for a writ of habeas corpus where the matter alleged is one which could have been raised in a PCR application . . . his only means of obtaining state habeas corpus relief is to file a petition in the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court”).
HEARN, C.J., and GOOLSBY and WILLIAMS, JJ. concur.
 Because oral argument would not aid the court in resolving the issues on appeal, we decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.