PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF
In The Court of Appeals
Coralean Montgomery, Respondent,
Wateree Community Actions, Inc., Appellant.
B. Hicks Harwell, Jr., Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2006-UP-145
Submitted March 1, 2006 – Filed March 13, 2006
Ronnie Alan Sabb, of Kingstree; for Appellant.
Chalmers C. Johnson and Bonnie T. Hunt, of
Charleston; for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Wateree Community Actions, Inc. (also referred to as the Agency) appeals a judgment in a retaliatory discharge action, arguing the plaintiff, Coralen Montgomery, failed to effect service of process. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 4, 2001,
Montgomery appealed her termination in accordance with the Agency’s internal grievance procedures. Although the Agency acknowledged receipt of her appeal and scheduled a hearing with the Head Start Policy Council Grievance Committee, the hearing was postponed twice at the request of
On May 22, 2002,
On July 12, 2002,
In its brief to this court, the Agency stated that, at the hearing on Montgomery’s motion for default, her attorney presented (1) proof of service as evidenced by the return receipt signed by Parnell and the cover letter to the Agency, with which the summons and complaint were enclosed; (2) a document purporting to show that, according to the records maintained by the South Carolina Secretary of State, the Agency’s registered agent information was listed as “Principle [sic] Office, 116 E. Canal Street, Sumter, South Carolina.” Counsel for the Agency presented a letter its attorney had received from Johnson, the executive director, averring (1) neither she nor anyone else at the administrative offices had received the pleadings, and (2) the agency had been located at the
On August 27, 2003, the trial court filed an order finding the Agency to be in default. In the order, the trial court also found Montgomery entitled to “Judgment by default on all causes of action as plead [sic] in the Complaint, and for all damages set forth in the Complaint” and stated it would set a damages hearing.
At a nonjury damages hearing on August 4, 2004, the trial court awarded
On appeal, the Agency argues the trial court erred in granting Montgomery’s motion for default judgment, contending (1) the judgment was void because service of process was ineffective under Rule 4(d)(8) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure in that the delivery was not restricted to the addressee; (2) there was no evidence that Parnell was an officer or manager of the Agency or otherwise authorized to accept service of process on its behalf; and (3) Montgomery herself acknowledged at the damages hearing that she had known for eleven years the Agency’s main office was on South Main Street, but could not explain why the summons and complaint were sent to the Canal Street address. These arguments, however, when evaluated in conjunction with the record before us, are insufficient to reverse the default judgment.
Rule 4 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs service of process on defendants in civil actions, serves two purposes, one of which is to confer personal jurisdiction on the court over the defendant. “Objections to personal jurisdiction, unlike subject matter jurisdiction, are waived unless raised.” “For good cause shown the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a judgment by default has been entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b).”
“It is well settled that, but for a very few exceptional circumstances, an appellate court cannot address an issue unless it was raised to and ruled upon by the trial court.” Furthermore, “[t]he appellant has the burden of providing this court with a sufficient record upon which to make a decision.”
The Agency alleged in its brief that, during the course of the default hearing, it submitted a letter from Rubye Johnson regarding its correct location and Parnell’s status as an employee. The record, however, does not contain a transcript of this hearing. Furthermore, even if we were give the Agency the benefit of the doubt and assume for the purpose of this appeal that it moved to set aside the entry of default and raised these issues to the trial court, neither the order issued pursuant to this hearing nor the order issued after the damages hearing ruled on either of these arguments. Under these circumstances, we hold there is no basis on which we can reverse the default judgment against the Agency.
GOOLSBY, HUFF, and STILWELL, JJ., concur.
 Because oral argument would not aid the court in resolving the issue on appeal, we decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
 Bakala v. Bakala, 352 S.C. 612, 629, 576 S.E.2d 156, 165 (2003).
 Rule 55(c), SCRCP.
 Lucas v. Rawl Family Ltd. P’ship, 359 S.C. 505, 510-11, 598 S.E.2d 712, 715 (2004).
 Medlock v. One 1985 Jeep Cherokee 1JCWB7828FT129001, 322 S.C. 127, 132, 470 S.E.2d 373, 376 (1996).