THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS
PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(D)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF
In The Court of Appeals
Waterford Place Homeowners Association of Lexington, Inc., Respondent,
Richie D. Barnes, Appellant.
Marc H. Westbrook, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2006-UP-289
Submitted June 1, 2006 – Filed June 21, 2006
Richie D. Barnes, pro se, of
Columbia; for Appellant.
Walter B. Todd, Jr., of
Columbia; for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Richie D. Barnes appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in an action to foreclose his property for unpaid assessments. We affirm. 
Waterford Place Homeowner’s Association of Lexington, Inc. (
After serving interrogatories on Barnes and finding his answers unsatisfactory,
Barnes contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in an action to foreclose his property due to unpaid assessments. We disagree.
When reviewing the grant of a summary judgment motion, appellate courts apply the same standard which governs the trial court under Rule 56(c), SCRCP, which states that summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), SCRCP; Helms Realty, Inc. v. Gibson-Wall Co., 363 S.C. 334, 340, 611 S.E.2d 485, 488 (2005). On appeal from an order granting summary judgment, the appellate court will review all ambiguities, conclusions, and inferences arising in and from the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party below. Willis v. Wu, 362 S.C. 146, 150-51, 607 S.E.2d 63, 65 (2004); see also, Schmidt v. Courtney, 357 S.C. 310, 316-17, 592 S.E.2d 326, 330 (Ct. App. 2003) (stating all ambiguities, conclusions, and inferences arising from the evidence must be construed most strongly against the moving party).
Summary judgment is not appropriate when further inquiry into the facts of the case is desirable to clarify the application of the law. Gadson v. Hembree, 364 S.C. 316, 320, 613 S.E.2d 533, 535 (2005); Montgomery v. CSX Transp., Inc., 362 S.C. 529, 542, 608 S.E.2d 440, 447 (Ct. App. 2004). Even when there is no dispute as to evidentiary facts, but only as to the conclusions or inferences to be drawn from them,
summary judgment should be denied. Nelson v.
It is undisputed the Covenants of Waterford Place provide that each owner by acceptance of the deed agrees to pay the assessments and a failure to do so may result in a foreclosure. Barnes readily admits he failed to pay the assessments since June 3, 2002. The trial court was correct in concluding that regardless of
Barnes also argues that by granting summary judgment, the trial court violated his “constitutional right to have trial by jury.” Barnes cites Rule 38(a), SCRCP, as the basis for his argument. Though Rule 38(a) does provide for a trial by jury in certain cases, Rule 56, SCRCP, provides for summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In essence, Rule 56 allows for an efficient disposition of a case when there is no need for it to go to a jury. Barnes’ right to a jury trial was not violated by the granting of summary judgment. To hold otherwise would mean that whenever a jury demand is made, summary judgment is no longer an option.
For the reasons stated herein, the trial court’s decision is
SHORT, WILLIAMS, JJ., AND CURETON, A.J., CONCUR.
 We decide this case without oral argument, pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.