THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS
PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF
In The Court of Appeals
Dale C. Pfeil, II, d/b/a DP Associates, Appellant,
Steven Walker Homes
Corporation; Steven Walker
Homes, L.L.C.; Steven
Walker Communities, Inc.;
Steven Berzansky and David
Peery, d/b/a Steven Walker
Homes Corporation, Steven
Walker Homes L.L.C. and
Steven Walker Communities,
Inc.; Robert W. Palmer;
Rebecca W. Palmer; Kenneth C.
Nugent; Laurese A. Nugent;
Chase Manhattan Mortgage
Corporation; First Gaston Bank
North Carolina; Pamela
Macaluso; Daniel L. Luithele;
Melissa D. Luithele; Wachovia
Bank; Fieldstone Mortgage
Corporation; Crown Homes,
Inc.; Joanne M. Anderson;
Wachovia Mortgage Corporation;
Cooperative Mortgage Services,
Inc.; First Union National Bank;
Brian C. Wilson; John E. Peterson;
Harper Peterson & Rogers, P.A.;
Rogers & Reno,
P.A.; and Marvin Barman, Defendants.
Of whom Steven Walker
Steven Walker Homes, L.L.C.,
Steve Berzansky; David Peery;
Pamela Macaluso; Fieldstone
Crown Homes, Inc.; Joanne M.
Anderson; Wachovia Mortgage
Corporation; Brian C. Wilson;
Harper Peterson Rogers &
Reno, P.A.; and Marvin Barman
S. Jackson Kimball, Master In Equity
Unpublished Opinion No. 2006-UP-359
Submitted September 1, 2006 – Filed October 23, 2006
Mitchell K. Byrd, of Hilton Head, for Appellant.
Brian S. McCoy, of Rock Hill, for Respondents Steven Walker Homes Corporation, Steven Walker Homes, L.L.C., Steven Berzansky, David Peery, and Marvin Barman.
Curtis W. Dowling and Andrea C. Pope, both of
Columbia, for Respondent Harper, Peterson, Rogers & Reno, P.A.
John J. Hearn, of
Columbia, for Respondent Joanne M. Anderson.
Lucy L. McDow, of
Rock Hill, for Respondent Brian C. Wilson.
Louis H. Lang, of
Columbia, for Respondents Pamela Macaluso, Crown Homes, Inc., and Fieldstone Mortgage Corporation.
Pearce W. Fleming, of
Columbia, for Respondent Wachovia Mortgage Corporation.
PER CURIAM: Dale C. Pfeil, II, doing business as DP Associates, appeals the grant of partial summary judgment to Steven Walker Homes, L.L.C. and its principals (collectively Walker), and the grant of summary judgment to all other defendants. We affirm.
Walker, a home builder, purchased property in
Pfeil was a masonry subcontractor for
In the interim, NationsBank brought an action to foreclose its mortgages, and named Pfeil as a defendant. Pfeil defaulted.
In an effort to maximize return for
In order to sell both Lot 33 and Lot 130,
Pfeil filed an action to enforce his judgment against
Wilson, Barman, and the law firm filed motions for summary judgment, which the circuit court granted.
I. Did the circuit court err in granting summary judgment to all defendants on Pfeil’s fraudulent conveyance claim?
II. Did the circuit court err in granting summary judgment to all defendants on Pfeil’s unlawful assignment claim?
III. Did the circuit court err in granting summary judgment to Walker, Wilson, Barman, and the law firm on Pfeil’s unfair trade practices, civil conspiracy, and intentional harm claims?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
An appellate court reviews the grant of summary judgment under the same standard applied by the circuit court. David v. McLeod Reg’l
I. Fraudulent Conveyance
Pfeil argues the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to all defendants on his fraudulent conveyance claim. We disagree.
The Statute of Elizabeth, codified at section 27-23-10 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2005), renders void any transfer of property made with the “intent or purpose to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors and others.” Carr v. Guerard, 365 S.C. 151, 153-54, 616 S.E.2d 429, 430 (2005). When a transfer is supported by valuable consideration, it may be set aside as a fraudulent conveyance only if an actual intent to defraud creditors may be imputable to the grantee. Royal Z Lanes, Inc. v. Collins Holding Corp., 337 S.C. 592, 594, 524 S.E.2d 621, 622 (1999).
A creditor seeking to void a transfer need not establish actual knowledge of, or participation in, the debtor’s fraudulent intention by the grantee. See Coleman v. Daniel, 261 S.C. 198, 210, 199 S.E.2d 74, 80 (1973). Rather, “[t]he transaction is subject to attack if at the time of the transfer the transferee had notice of circumstances which would arouse the suspicion of an ordinarily prudent man and cause him to make inquiry as to the purpose for which the transfer was being made, which would disclose the fraudulent intent of the maker.”
In this case, both transfers were supported by valuable consideration. Accordingly, Pfeil must show
Additionally, NationBank’s status as a secured creditor with respect to Lot 33 and
Pfeil does not argue his claim, unsecured at the time of these transfers, took priority over the claim of NationsBank or other secured creditors. Even if Pfeil had been a lien creditor at the time of the transfers, he would not have had priority over NationsBank because NationsBank had a properly recorded mortgage on both Lot 33 and
II. Unlawful Assignment
Pfeil contends the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to all defendants on his unlawful assignment claim. We disagree.
Section 27-25-10 of the
Any assignment by an insolvent debtor of his property for the benefit of his creditors in which any preference or priority is given to any creditor or creditors of the debtor by the terms of the assignment over any other creditor or creditors, other than as to any debts . . . in which any provision or disposition of the property so assigned is made or directed other than that it be distributed among all creditors of the insolvent debtor equally, in proportion to the amount of their several demands and without preference or priority of any kind whatsoever . . . shall be absolutely null and void and of no effect whatsoever.
We reiterate NationsBank filed a properly recorded mortgage on both Lot 33 and
III. Other Causes of Action
Pfeil argues the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to Wilson, Barman, the law firm, and Walker on his unfair trade practice, civil conspiracy, and intentional harm claims. We disagree.
To recover pursuant to the Unfair Trade Practices Act, “one must prove each of the following three elements by the greater weight or preponderance of the evidence: 1) a violation of the Act, 2) proximate cause, and 3) damages.” Charleston Lumber Co., Inc. v. Miller Housing Corp., 318 S.C. 471, 482, 458 S.E.2d 431, 438 (Ct. App. 1995). In this case, Pfeil alleges Wilson, Barman, and the law firm misled grantees, neglected to inform grantees of Pfeil’s pending claim, and failed to adequately disclose conflicts of interest to grantees.
“A civil conspiracy is a combination of two or more parties joined for the purpose of injuring the plaintiff, thereby causing . . . special damages.” Angus v. Burroughs & Chapin Co., 368 S.C. 167, 170, 628 S.E.2d 261, 262 (2006). In his appellate brief, Pfeil characterizes the civil conspiracy that Walker,
Based on Pfeil’s appellate brief, we interpret his claim of intentional harm to be a claim for intentional deprivation of a pecuniary or protected property interest. “A person who does any tortious act for the purpose of causing harm to another or to his things or to the pecuniary interests of another is liable to the other for such harm if it results.” Stewart v. Martin, 232 S.C. 483, 487, 102 S.E.2d 886, 888 (1958) (citation omitted).
Even if the acts alleged here rose to the level of an unfair or deceptive trade practice, a civil conspiracy, or an intent to harm Pfeil’s pecuniary or protected property interest, Pfeil fails to produce evidence he was damaged. For the reasons stated previously, Pfeil failed to show he could have recovered even if the transfers had not occurred. Accordingly, we hold the circuit court properly granted summary judgment to Wilson, Barman, the law firm, and Walker with respect to Pfeil’s unfair trade practice, civil conspiracy, and intentional harm claims.
HUFF and STILWELL, JJ., and CURETON, A.J., concur.
 The entity Steven Walker Homes Corporation and individuals Steven Berzansky and David Peery manage
 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
 Pfeil additionally argues the circuit court erred in finding Barman, Wilson, the law firm, and Berzansky did not aid or abet the alleged fraudulent conveyances. Because we find Pfeil failed to show a fraudulent conveyance, we need not address this issue.