THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
The State, Respondent,
Thomas Townsend, Appellant.
Appeal From Orangeburg County
Diane Schafer Goodstein, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2007-UP-387
Submitted September 1, 2007 – Filed September 24, 2007
Aileen P. Clare, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, all of Columbia; Solicitor David M. Pascoe, Jr., of Summerville, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Thomas Townsend pled guilty to driving under the influence, second offense. He was sentenced to one year imprisonment and a fine of $2,100, suspended on time served plus three years’ probation and payment of $1,000. The trial judge also imposed the following probation conditions: (1) substance abuse counseling; (2) random drug and alcohol testing—to include drug testing at least once a month; (3) attendance of at least three Alcohol Anonymous meetings per week; (4) intensive outpatient drug treatment if needed; and (5) anger management counseling. On appeal, Townsend argues the trial judge abused her discretion by ordering the additional probation conditions. We disagree. It is well within the authority of the trial judge to impose probation conditions. See S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-430 (Supp. 2005) (listing thirteen conditions of probation and stating “[t]he court may impose by order duly entered and may at any time modify the conditions of probation and may include among them” the listed conditions or others not prohibited by this section); see also State v. Brown, 284 S.C. 407, 410, 326 S.E.2d 410, 411 (1985) (holding trial courts are “allowed a wide, but not unlimited, discretion in imposing conditions of suspension or probation and they cannot impose conditions which are illegal and void as against public policy”). The conditions imposed in this case are not unreasonable or against public policy.
After a thorough review of the record and counsel’s brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Williams, 305 S.C. 116, 406 S.E.2d 357 (1991), we dismiss Townsend’s appeal and grant counsel’s motion to be relieved.
HEARN, C.J., HUFF and KITTREDGE, JJ., concur.
 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.