THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Historic Charleston Foundation and Preservation Society of Charleston, Appellants,
The City of Charleston, The City of Charleston Board of Zoning Appeals-Zoning and Library Associates, LLC, Respondents.
Appeal From Charleston County
R. Markley Dennis, Jr., Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2008-UP-252
Submitted May 1, 2008 – Filed May 7, 2008
Withdrawn, Substituted and Refiled August 1, 2008
Edward K. Pritchard, III, G. Trenholm Walker and Lindsay K. Smith-Yancey, all of Charleston, for Appellants.
David B. McCormack, Frances I. Cantwell, William B. Regan and Timothy Alan Domin, all of Charleston, for Respondents.
PER CURIAM: The Historic Charleston Foundation and Preservation Society of Charleston appeal the trial court’s order affirming the City of Charleston Board of Zoning Appeals’ renewal of a special exception to allow the building of a hotel. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220, SCACR, and the following authorities: Gordon v. Phillips Utils., Inc., 362 S.C. 403, 406, 608 S.E.2d 425, 427 (2005) (“The primary purpose in construing a statute is to ascertain legislative intent.”); Knotts v. S.C. Dep’t of Natural Res., 348 S.C. 1, 10, 558 S.E.2d 511, 516 (2002) (“What a legislature says in the text of a statute is considered the best evidence of the legislative intent or will.”); City of Myrtle Beach v. Juel P. Corp., 344 S.C. 43, 47, 543 S.E.2d 538, 540 (2001) (stating that when interpreting an ordinance, legislative intent must prevail if it can be reasonably discovered in the language used, and that we must give words their plain and ordinary meaning without resorting to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand the ordinance’s operation); Historic Charleston Found. v. Krawcheck, 313 S.C. 500, 505, 443 S.E.2d 401, 405 (Ct. App. 1994) (stating the courts give deference to the interpretation of a zoning ordinance by the board that is charged with its interpretation); Capco of Summerville, Inc. v. J.H. Gayle Constr. Co., 368 S.C. 137, 142, 628 S.E.2d 38, 41 (2006) (“Where there is one statute addressing an issue in general terms and another statute dealing with the identical issue in a more specific and definite manner, the more specific statute will be considered an exception to, or a qualifier of, the general statute and given such effect.”); Sloan v. S.C. Bd. of Physical Therapy Exam’rs, 370 S.C. 452, 485, 636 S.E.2d 598, 615 (2006) (stating due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands and that the requirements in a particular case depend on the importance of the interest involved and the circumstances under which the deprivation may occur.).
ANDERSON, HUFF, and KITTREDGE, JJ., concur.
 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.