THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
The State, Respondent,
Jerry Martin Hughes, Appellant.
Appeal From Greenville County
C. Victor Pyle, Jr., Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2008-UP-333
Heard June 4, 2008 – Filed July 1, 2008
Appellate Defender Kathrine H. Hudgins, South Carolina Commission, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, Senior Assistant Attorney General Harold M. Coombs, Jr., Office of the Attorney General, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Robert Mills Ariail, of Greenville, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Jerry Hughes appeals his convictions of trafficking in methamphetamine, possession of the controlled substance (Xanax), with intent to distribute, and possession of the controlled substance (morphine). Hughes asserts the detention and subsequent request for consent to search exceeded the scope of the original stop, and the scope of any general consent given was exceeded by the officer’s search. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: Hubbard v. Rowe, 192 S.C. 12, 5 S.E.2d 187 (1939) (stating the questions presented for appellate review must first have been fairly and properly raised in the lower court and passed upon by that court); I’On, L.L.C. v. Town of Mt. Pleasant, 338 S.C. 406, 422, 526 S.E.2d 716, 724 (2000) (finding a losing party must first try to convince the lower court it has ruled wrongly and then, if that effort fails, convince the appellate court that the lower court erred); State v. McKnight, 352 S.C. 635, 656, 576 S.E.2d 168, 179 (2003) (determining whether consent to search is voluntary is a question of fact to be resolved from the totality of the circumstances); State v. Brockman, 339 S.C. 57, 66, 528 S.E.2d 661, 665-66 (2000) (applying a “clearly erroneous” standard of review in determining whether trial judge properly held defendant consented to search); State v. Mattison, 352 S.C. 577, 585-86, 575 S.E.2d 852, 856 (Ct. App. 2003) (“The scope of the consent is measured by a test of ‘objective reasonableness-what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?’”); c.f. State v. Forrester, 343 S.C. 637, 541 S.E.2d 837 (2001) (finding a suspect’s overt act of merely opening the pocket book for inspection after consent was requested, limited the scope of the general grant of consent previously given).
HEARN, C.J., and SHORT, J., and KONDUROS, J., concur.
 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.