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2008-UP-565 - State v. Gilliard

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Matthew W. Gilliard, III, #2, Appellant.


Appeal From Greenville County
G. Edward Welmaker, Circuit Court Judge


Unpublished Opinion No. 2008-UP-565
Submitted October 1, 2008 – Filed October 13, 2008


AFFIRMED


Appellate Defender Kathrine H. Hudgins, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, Senior Assistant Attorney General Norman Mark Rapoport, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Robert Mills Ariail, of Greenville, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Matthew W. Gilliard, III, appeals from a jury verdict finding him guilty of assault and battery with intent to kill, first-degree burglary, possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime, and possession of cocaine.  Gilliard argues the trial court erred by denying his motions to (1) quash his grand jury indictment and (2) reinstruct the jury regarding reasonable doubt.  We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. Regarding Gilliard’s motion to quash the indictments: State v. Gentry, 363 S.C. 93, 102-03, 610 S.E.2d 494, 500 (2005) (“If the objection is timely made, the circuit court should judge the sufficiency of the indictment by determining whether (1) the offense is stated with sufficient certainty and particularity to enable the court to know what judgment to pronounce, and the defendant to know what he is called upon to answer and whether he may plead an acquittal or conviction thereon; and (2) whether it apprises the defendant of the elements of the offense that is intended to be charged.”); Rule 1101(d)(2), SCRE (stating the Rules of Evidence are not applicable to grand jury proceedings).

2. Regarding Gilliard’s motion to reinstruct the jury regarding reasonable doubt: Brightman v. State, 336 S.C. 348, 520 S.E.2d 614 (1999) (finding a King instruction, which provided that if a jury has reasonable doubt between lesser and greater offenses, it must resolve that doubt in the defendant’s favor, is no longer necessary now that the modern reasonable doubt charge instructs the jury to resolve doubts in favor of the defendant); Brown v. Stewart, 348 S.C. 33, 53, 557 S.E.2d 676, 686 (Ct. App. 2001) (“It is not error to refuse a request to charge when the substance of the request is included in the general instructions.”); State v. Barksdale, 311 S.C. 210, 216, 428 S.E.2d 498, 502 (Ct. App. 1993) (“When a jury requests an additional charge, it is sufficient for the court to charge only those matters necessary to answer the jury’s request.”). 

AFFIRMED.[1]

SHORT, THOMAS, and PIEPER, JJ., concur.


[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.