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2009-UP-060 - State v. Lloyd

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Lewis Lloyd, Appellant.


Appeal From Richland County
James W. Johnson, Jr., Circuit Court Judge


Unpublished Opinion No. 2009-UP-060
Submitted January 2, 2009 – Filed January 22, 2009   


AFFIRMED


Appellate Defender Lanelle C. Durant, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, Senior Assistant Attorney General Norman Mark Rapoport, Solicitor Warren B. Giese, all of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Lewis Lloyd appeals his convictions and sentences for second-degree arson and assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature, arguing the trial judge erred: (1) in admitting Lloyd’s custodial statement to a police officer, and (2) in refusing to admit evidence of a victim’s prior convictions.  We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Forrester, 343 S.C. 637, 642, 541 S.E.2d 837, 840 (2001) (stating to properly preserve an evidentiary issue for review, the moving party must also make a contemporaneous objection when the evidence is introduced unless the judge rules on the issue immediately prior to the introduction of the evidence); State v. Day, 341 S.C. 410, 420, 535 S.E.2d 431, 436 (2000) (“[W]hether a specific instance of conduct by the [victim] is closely connected in point of time or occasion to the [incident] so as to be admissible is in the judge’s discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice to the accused.”); State v. Brown, 321 S.C. 184, 187, 467 S.E.2d 922, 924 (1996) (holding no abuse of discretion occurred where the trial judge refused to admit the victim’s twenty-three-year-old manslaughter conviction “[b]ased on the remoteness” in time to the incident). 

AFFIRMED.

HEARN, C.J., SHORT and KONDUROS, JJ., concur. 


[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.