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2009-UP-063 - SCDMV v. Galloway

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles, Respondent,

v.

Linda R. Galloway, Appellant.


Appeal from the Administrative Law Court
 Ralph K. Anderson, III, Administrative Law Court Judge


Unpublished Opinion No. 2009-UP-063
Submitted February 2, 2009 – Filed February 3, 2009    


AFFIRMED


Desa Ballard and P. Christopher Smith, Jr., both of West Columbia, and Reese I. Joye, of North Charleston, for Appellant.

Frank L. Valenta, Jr., of Blythewood, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Linda R. Galloway appeals the Administrative Law Court's (ALC) order reversing the South Carolina Division of Motor Vehicle Hearings' (hearing officer) order rescinding the suspension of Galloway's driver's license.  We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities.

1.       As to whether the ALC erred by failing to set forth a specific ground for overturning the hearing officer's decision: S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380 (5)(e) (Supp. 2008) (providing an appellate court may reverse or modify the decision of the agency if the substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record).

2.       As to whether the ALC erred in reversing the hearing officer's holding that the police officer's testimony was insufficient to establish the officer provided Galloway the correct implied consent advisement: S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2950 (Supp. 2008) (providing the arresting officer must provide the implied consent advisement in writing prior to administering a breath test, and setting forth the implied consent advisement); Felder v. Johnston, 127 S.C. 215, 217, 121 S.E. 54, 54 (1924) ("In the absence of evidence to the contrary, courts are bound to presume that public officers have properly discharged their duties and that their acts are in all respects regular.").

AFFIRMED.

HUFF, WILLIAMS, and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.


[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.