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2009-UP-082 - State v. Grant

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals


The State, Respondent,

v.

Kevin Lamar Grant, Appellant.


Appeal From Charleston County
Deadra L. Jefferson, Circuit Court Judge


Unpublished Opinion No. 2009-UP-082
Heard January 8, 2009 – Filed February 12, 2009


AFFIRMED


Chief Appellate Defender Joseph L. Savitz, III, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Assistant Attorney General Melody J.  Brown, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Scarlett Anne Wilson, of Charleston, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Kevin Lamar Grant appeals from his convictions for murder and using a firearm during the commission of a violent crime.  Grant asserts the trial court erred by (1) refusing to direct a verdict acquitting him of these charges and (2) allowing into evidence a statement he made while in the custody of investigating detectives.  We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: 

1. Regarding the trial court’s refusal to grant a directed verdict in Grant’s favor:  State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292, 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006) (stating in reviewing the denial of a directed verdict, the appellate court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State); State v. McCombs, 368 S.C. 489, 493, 629 S.E.2d 361, 362-63 (2006) (stating a defendant is entitled to a directed verdict when the State fails to produce evidence of the charged offense; however, if there is any direct evidence or substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, the case is properly submitted to the jury); State v. Fleming, 254 S.C. 415, 420, 175 S.E.2d 624, 626 (1970) (explaining when the evidence “merely raises a suspicion” the accused is guilty, the trial court should grant the motion for directed verdict). 

2. Regarding Grant’s argument that his statements were involuntary and should have been suppressed because they were induced by implied promises:  State v. Johnson, 363 S.C. 53, 58-59, 609 S.E.2d 520, 523 (2005) (internal citation omitted) (“The objection should be addressed to the trial court in a sufficiently specific manner that brings attention to the exact error.  If a party fails to properly object, the party is procedurally barred from raising the issue on appeal.”); State v. Adams, 354 S.C. 361, 380, 580 S.E.2d 785, 795 (Ct. App. 2003) (“[A] defendant may not argue one ground below and another on appeal.”).

AFFIRMED.

HEARN, C.J., SHORT and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.