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2009-UP-087 - Williams v. Bozeman

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Willard M. Williams, Jr., Appellant/Respondent,

v.

Charles C. Bozeman, Robin C. Bozeman, d/b/a Robin Bozeman Trucking, Respondents/Appellants,

And Turkeesha C. Minnifield and Dease Construction, Respondents.


Appeal From Georgetown County
 Benjamin H. Culbertson, Circuit Court Judge


Unpublished Opinion No. 2009-UP-087
Heard December 11, 2008 – Filed February 12, 2009   


AFFIRMED


Jeffrey E. Johnson, of Conway, for Appellant/Respondent.

Glenn V. Ohanesian, J. Dwight Hudson, and Mary Anne Graham, all of Myrtle Beach, for Respondents/Appellants.

G. Michael Smith, of Conway, for Respondent Dease Construction. 

Margaret Fanning Horn, of Charleston, for Respondent Minnifield.

PER CURIAM: Willard M. Williams along with Charles C. Bozeman (Bozeman) and Robin C. Bozeman appeal the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Dease Construction on their causes of action for negligent entrustment (Issue I).  Williams also argues a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether Bozeman was negligent because he presented evidence Bozeman was speeding and caused the accident (Issue II).  We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: Issue I: Fleming v. Rose, 350 S.C. 488, 493, 567 S.E.2d 857, 860 (2002) (providing summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law); Am. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Passmore, 275 S.C. 618, 621, 274 S.E.2d 416, 418 (1981) ("The theory of negligent entrustment provides: 'the owner or one in control of the vehicle and responsible for its use who is negligent in entrusting it to another can be held liable for such negligent entrustment.' "); Wineglass v. McMinn, 235 S.C. 537, 541, 112 S.E.2d 652, 654 (1960) (holding ample evidence established the appellants' agent was negligent in leaving an inexperienced, fourteen-year-old to attend to the truck with ignition key because the employee "should have foreseen as a reasonable and probable consequence . . . the safety of others on the street would be endangered by the boy's attempt to drive it"); Dennis by Evans v. Timmons, 313 S.C. 338, 341, 437 S.E.2d 138, 141 (Ct. App. 1993) ("When a person has not furnished the instrumentality but through negligence allowed access thereto to a child, the standard for imposing liability upon the person is whether the person knew of the child's proclivity or propensity for the specific dangerous activity which caused the harm."); and Issue II: Coleman v. Shaw, 281 S.C. 107, 110, 314 S.E.2d 154, 156 (Ct. App. 1984) (holding violation of a statute is negligence per se but once established, the court must still examine the question of proximate cause); Rayfield v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 297 S.C. 95, 103-04, 374 S.E.2d 910, 915 (Ct. App. 1988) ("Negligence per se simply means the jury need not decide if the defendant acted as would a reasonable man in the circumstances.  The statute fixes the standard of conduct required of the defendant, leaving the jury merely to decide whether the defendant breached the statute.  If he did, his failure to take due care is established as a matter of law. The only issue then left for the jury to determine is the third element of negligence, . . . whether the defendant's conduct proximately caused damage to the plaintiff."); Blanding v. Hammell, 267 S.C. 352, 357, 228 S.E.2d 271, 272-73 (1976) (holding when "speed has not been a causative factor, the court has focused on the inevitability of the accident, irrespective of the defendant's speed, due to an unexpected entry of the plaintiff into the defendant's right of way"); Odom v. Steigerwald, 260 S.C. 422, 428, 196 S.E.2d 635, 638 (1973) ("Assuming . . . the plaintiff was driving at an excessive rate of speed and was negligent, we think, as a matter of law, that such was not a contributing proximate cause. The real cause, the more immediate and efficient cause, was the improper driving conduct of [the defendant].  By driving his car directly into the path of plaintiff's vehicle when plaintiff was obviously so close to the intersection, [the defendant] created a trap from which plaintiff could not escape.").

AFFIRMED.

HEARN, C.J., and SHORT and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.