THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
The State, Respondent,
Antonio D. Bradley, Appellant.
Appeal From Greenville County
C. Victor Pyle, Jr., Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2009-UP-168
Submitted April 1, 2009 – Filed April 27, 2009
Appellate Defender Elizabeth A. Franklin, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, Senior Asst. Attorney General Norman Mark Rapoport, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Robert Mills Ariail, of Greenville, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Antonio Bradley appeals from his convictions for criminal sexual conduct (CSC) with a minor in the second-degree and committing a lewd act upon a child. Bradley argues the trial court committed reversible error in (1) prohibiting him from meaningfully cross-examining the State’s witnesses, (2) admitting inappropriate collaborative testimony, and (3) allowing inadmissible hearsay into evidence. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:
1. As to whether the trial court prohibited meaningful cross-examination of the State’s witnesses: State v. Simmons, 360 S.C. 33, 46, 599 S.E.2d 448, 454 (2004) (stating the failure to make a proffer of excluded evidence will preclude review on appeal); State v. Santiago, 370 S.C. 153, 634 S.E.2d 23 (Ct. App. 2006) (requiring a proffer of testimony to preserve the issue of whether testimony was properly excluded by the trial judge and stating an appellate court will not consider alleged error in the exclusion of testimony unless the Record on Appeal shows fairly what the excluded testimony would have been); State v. Hawkins, 310 S.C. 50, 54, 425 S.E.2d 50, 57 (Ct. App. 1992) (declining to rule on the court’s alleged error of excluding evidence when no proffer was made, and the excluded evidence was not contained in the Record).
2. As to whether the trial court admitted inappropriate collaborative testimony: State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142, 587 S.E.2d 691, 693-94 (2003) (“A party may not argue one ground at trial and an alternate ground on appeal.”); State v. Holliday, 333 S.C. 332, 509 S.E.2d 280 (Ct. App. 1998) (stating to preserve an alleged error in admitting evidence, the objection should be sufficiently specific to bring into focus the precise nature of the alleged error so it can be reasonably understood by the trial judge).
3. As to whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing inadmissible hearsay into evidence: State v. Johnson, 363 S.C. 53, 58-59, 609 S.E.2d 520, 523 (2005) (internal citations omitted) (“To preserve an issue for review there must be a contemporaneous objection that is ruled upon by the trial court. The objection should be addressed to the trial court in a sufficiently specific manner that brings attention to the exact error. If a party fails to properly object, the party is procedurally barred from raising the issue on appeal.”); State v. Vanderbilt, 287 S.C. 597, 598, 340 S.E.2d 543, 544 (1986) (stating an issue that is not properly preserved cannot be raised for the first time on appeal); Rule 803(3), SCRE (explaining a "statement of the declarant’s then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition” is not excluded by the hearsay rule).
Huff, Williams, and Konduros, JJ., concur.
 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.