THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Faith Davenport Wood, a/k/a Faith Davenport, Appellant,
Gloria Goddard, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Dewey L. Robertson, Sr., Respondent,
The United States of America acting through its agent, The Internal Revenue Service, Third-Party Defendant.
Appeal From Saluda County
Kathy Rushton, Special Referee
Unpublished Opinion No. 2009-UP-208
Submitted April 1, 2009 – Filed May 18, 2009
Orin Gail Briggs, of Lexington, for Appellant.
Demetri K. Koutrakos, of Columbia, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Faith Davenport Wood appeals the circuit court’s determination that she was not entitled to amend her complaint following the district court’s remand of Dewey L. Robertson’s counterclaim for ejectment and the special referee’s order directing the Saluda County Sheriff to eject any occupants from the subject property as well as awarding damages to Robertson. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:
1. As to whether: (1) the circuit court erred in failing to properly interpret and apply Rule 54, FRCP; (2) the circuit court erred in failing to address issues not precluded by the doctrine of res judicata; and (3) this court should apply the holding in Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006): Staubes v. City of Folly Beach, 339 S.C. 406, 412, 529 S.E.2d 543, 546 (2000) (holding in order for an issue to be preserved for appellate review it must be raised and ruled upon by the circuit court).
2. As to whether the circuit court erred in denying Wood’s motion to amend her complaint: USAA Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Clegg, 377 S.C. 643, 660, 661 S.E.2d 791, 800 (2008) (explaining an issue must be raised and ruled upon in the circuit court in order to be preserved for appellate review); Crawford v. Henderson, 356 S.C. 389, 409, 589 S.E.2d 204, 215 (Ct. App. 2003) (stating a party can not argue one ground at trial and then an alternative ground on appeal).
3. As to whether the special referee erred in determining Robertson was entitled to eject occupants from the subject property: S.C. Code Ann. § 15-67-610 (2005) (explaining a person who possesses land without the consent of the owner is liable for trespass and the owner may request a court to eject the trespasser); S.C. Code Ann. § 27-40-210(6) & (15) (2007) (defining landlord as “the owner, lessor, or sublessor of the premises” and a tenant as “a person entitled under a rental agreement to occupy a dwelling unit to the exclusion of others[.]”).
4. As to whether the special referee erred in determining Wood was liable for the fair market value for rent on the subject property throughout the litigation: In re Care and Treatment of McCracken, 346 S.C. 87, 92, 551 S.E.2d 235, 238 (2001) (“A bald assertion, without supporting argument, does not preserve an issue for appeal.”).
HEARN, C.J., PIEPER and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.
 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.