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2009-UP-264 - State v. Rollins

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Myrtle Elizabeth Rollins, Appellant.


Appeal From York County
 Lee S. Alford, Circuit Court Judge


Unpublished Opinion No. 2009-UP-264
Submitted May 1, 2009 – Filed June 2, 2009   


AFFIRMED


Appellate Defender Kathrine H. Hudgins, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott,

Assistant Attorney General Deborah R.J. Shupe, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Kevin Scott Brackett, of York, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Myrtle Elizabeth Rollins appeals her two-year sentence for attempt to obtain a controlled substance by fraud following her termination from the York County Drug Court Program (Drug Court).  We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1.  As to whether the trial court erred in finding Rollins did not successfully complete Drug Court:  State v. Lee, 350 S.C. 125, 130, 564 S.E.2d 372, 75 (Ct. App. 2002) (stating an issue must be raised to and ruled upon by the trial court to be preserved for appellate review).

2.  As to whether the trial court erred in failing to exercise its discretion to reduce Rollins’s original sentence: Rule 29, SCRCrimP (“Except for motions for new trials based on after-discovered evidence, post-trial motions shall be made within ten days after the imposition of the sentence.”); State v. Campbell, 376 S.C. 212, 215-16, 656 S.E.2d 371, 373 (2008) (explaining the long-standing rule of law that a trial court is without jurisdiction to consider a criminal matter once the term of court during which judgment was entered expires); State v. Perkins, 378 S.C. 57, 61, 661 S.E.2d 366, 368 (2008) (upholding the imposition of an appellant’s original sentence where it found the trial court correctly determined that appellant violated a condition of the suspended sentence, and therefore, properly imposed appellant’s original sentence).

AFFIRMED.

HUFF, PIEPER, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.


[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.