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2009-UP-403 - SCDOT v. Pratt

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

South Carolina Department of Transportation, Respondent,

v.

James K. Pratt and the Citizens Bank, Mortgagee, other Condemnee, Defendants, Of Whom James K. Pratt is Appellant.


Appeal From Florence County
 Thomas A. Russo, Circuit Court Judge


Unpublished Opinion No. 2009-UP-403
Heard June 10, 2009 – Filed August 17, 2009


AFFIRMED


Larry G. Reddeck of Lake City, for Appellant.

James C. Rushton, III, Florence, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  This is an appeal of a jury verdict in a condemnation case.  James K. Pratt, the landowner, contends the trial judge erred in limiting his presentation of cost-to-cure evidence and in instructing the jury not to consider such evidence as either an element of damages or as a criterion for the determination of damages.  We affirm pursuant to Rule 220, SCACR, and the following authorities:  S.C. Code Ann. § 28-2-370 (2007) (allowing in a determination of just compensation consideration of only the value of the property to be taken, any diminution in the value of the landowner's remaining property, and any benefits of the proposed project to the landowner); id. § 28-2-500 (stating the amount offered by the condemnor as just compensation for a taking "is not admissible evidence and may not be referred to at the trial"); S.C. State Highway Dep't v. Carodale, 268 S.C. 556, 563, 235 S.E.2d 127, 130 (1977) (affirming the trial court's charge in a just compensation proceeding that "the compensable measure of damages was the value to the land at the date of the taking plus any resulting injury to the remaining property offset by any benefits to the remaining land as a result of the project"); S.C. State Highway Dep't v. Bolt, 242 S.C. 411, 417, 131 S.E.2d 264, 267 (1963) (describing special damages to the land remaining after a portion of the tract is condemned as including "any damage or any decrease in actual value of the remainder of the landowner's property which are the direct and proximate consequence of the acquisition of the right of way"); id. at 419-20, 131 S.E.2d at 268 (affirming the trial judge's refusal to allow an aggrieved landowner to present evidence to the jury of the cost of constructing new buildings to replace those on the remainder property that were allegedly rendered worthless by acquisition of the right-of-way).

AFFIRMED.

HEARN, C.J., THOMAS and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.