THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court
The State, Appellant,
Jimmy Skelton, Respondent.
Appeal From Oconee County
Alexander S. Macaulay, Circuit Court Judge
Memorandum Opinion No. 2010-MO-027
Heard October 19, 2010 – Filed November 1, 2010
John Benjamin Aplin, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Appellate Defender M. Celia Robinson, and Appellate Defender LaNelle Cantey DuRant, of South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense, of Columbia, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: The South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services (SCDPPPS) appeals the circuit court's order discharging Jimmy Skelton from any further Global Positioning System (GPS) monitoring related to his conviction for first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC) with a minor and subsequent violation of the Community Supervision Program (CSP). SCDPPPS claims the circuit court erred in finding that a retroactive application of State v. McGrier, 378 S.C. 320, 663 S.E.2d 15 (2008), via Bennett v. State, 380 S.C. 215, 669 S.E.2d 594 (2008), mandated the removal of the GPS monitoring.
During the hearing before the circuit court, the SCDPPPS conceded that Skelton should not have been in the CSP at the time of the alleged violations given this Court's decision in McGrier and the retroactive application established in Bennett. Based on this concession, Skelton should have been released from any further supervision by the SCDPPPS and, thus, should not have been subjected to GPS monitoring. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's order pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: Bank of N.Y. v. Sumter County, 387 S.C. 147, 155 n.3, 691 S.E.2d 473, 477 n.3 (2010) (concluding that where there was no objection to the trial judge's analytical approach, the judge's finding regarding the issue became the law of the case; recognizing that an unchallenged ruling, right or wrong, is the law of the case); First Union Nat'l Bank of S.C. v. Soden, 333 S.C. 554, 566, 511 S.E.2d 372, 378 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding an "unchallenged ruling, right or wrong, is the law of the case and requires affirmance").
TOAL, C.J., PLEICONES, BEATTY, KITTREDGE and HEARN, JJ., concur.
 See S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-560 (2007) (outlining the CSP operated by the SCDPPPS, including the procedures regarding violations and successive revocations); S.C. Code Ann. § 23-3-540(B) (2007) ("An offender who violates a term of probation, parole, community supervision, or a community supervision program must be ordered by the court to be placed by the Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services under a system of active electronic monitoring.").
 McGrier, 378 S.C. at 332, 663 S.E.2d at 21 (interpreting section 24-21-560(D), the successive revocation provision of the CSP statute, and finding that a circuit court may not impose a sentence for a CSP revocation that would result in an inmate being incarcerated for an aggregate period of time that extended beyond the unsuspended portion of the original, straight sentence).
 Bennett, 380 S.C. at 217, 669 S.E.2d at 595 (considering habeas corpus petitions of inmates alleging their continued incarceration for CSP violations, after fully serving their original sentences, was unconstitutional and concluding that McGrier is to be applied retroactively).