THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court
The State, Respondent,
Yancey Ranchara Thompson, Appellant.
Appeal From Lexington County
John M. Milling, Circuit Court Judge
Memorandum Opinion No. 2010-MO-028
Heard October 20, 2010 – Filed November 8, 2010
Appellate Defender M. Celia Robinson and Chief Appellate Defender Robert M. Dudek, both of South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense, of Columbia, for Appellant
Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, Senior Assistant Attorney General Harold M. Coombs, Jr., of Office of the Attorney General, of Columbia, and Solicitor Donald V. Myers, of Lexington, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Appellant Yancey Thompson ("Thompson") appeals his convictions for Criminal Sexual Conduct in the First Degree, Criminal Sexual Conduct in the Second Degree, and Dissemination of Harmful Material to a Minor. On appeal, Thompson argues the circuit court erred in: (1) not giving preclusive effect under collateral estoppel to a consent order from the family court stating the victim was abused by an "unknown perpetrator"; (2) failing to direct a verdict of acquittal because the State did not produce sufficient evidence that one of the crimes occurred in Lexington County; and (3) failing to find the State violated its disclosure obligations. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities:
1. Collateral Estoppel: Beall v. Doe, 281 S.C. 363, 371, 315 S.E.2d 186, 191 (Ct. App. 1984) ("[T]o assert collateral estoppel successfully, the party seeking issue preclusion still must show that the issue was actually litigated and directly determined in the prior action . . . .").
2. Directed Verdict: State v. Williams, 321 S.C. 327, 334, 468 S.E.2d 626, 630 (1996) ("[V]enue, like jurisdiction, in a criminal case need not be affirmatively proved, and circumstantial evidence of venue, though slight, is sufficient to establish jurisdiction.") (emphasis added).
3. Disclosure Violations: State v. Landon, 370 S.C. 103, 108, 634 S.E.2d 660, 663 (2006) ("A violation of Rule 5 is not reversible unless prejudice is shown."); State v. Hughes, 336 S.C. 585, 593, 521 S.E.2d 500, 504-05 (1999) (holding the failure to disclose a law enforcement report did not violate Rule 5 where the information contained in the report was available to the defense before trial).
TOAL, C.J., PLEICONES, BEATTY, KITTREDGE and HEARN, JJ., concur.
 We decline to reach Thompson's arguments regarding a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), because he did not raise them to the circuit court. See State v. Hughes, 336 S.C. 585, 593 n.4, 521 S.E.2d 500, 505 n.4 (1999) (declining to address Brady claim because it was not preserved even though the appellant's Rule 5 claim was).