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2010-UP-197 - State v. Gilliam

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Danny Ray Gilliam, Appellant.


Appeal From Pickens County
 John C. Few, Circuit Court Judge


Unpublished Opinion No.  2010-UP-197
Submitted March 1, 2010 – Filed March 10, 2010


AFFIRMED


Deputy Chief Appellate Defender Wanda H. Carter, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General Deborah R.J. Shupe, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Robert Mills Ariail, of Greenville, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Danny Ray Gilliam appeals his conviction and sentence for petit larceny and first-degree burglary, arguing the trial court erred in allowing the State to reopen its case to enter evidence supporting an aggravating circumstance and in denying Gilliam's motion for a directed verdict.  We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:  State v. Wilson, 345 S.C. 1, 5-6, 545 S.E.2d 827, 829 (2001) (holding in criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only and is bound by the factual findings of the circuit court unless clearly erroneous).

1.  As to whether the trial court erred in allowing the State to reopen its case to enter evidence supporting an aggravating circumstance:  State v. Humphery, 276 S.C. 42, 43, 274 S.E.2d 918, 918 (1981) (finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the State to reopen its case-in-chief to submit evidence of an essential element of the offense charged and specifically permitting reopening of grand larceny case to prove value of stolen goods); State v. Hammond, 270 S.C. 347, 355-56, 242 S.E.2d 411, 415 (1978) (finding no prejudice where additional evidence submitted was merely corroborative of other evidence).[2]

2.  As to whether the trial court erred in denying Gilliam's motion for a directed verdict:  Rule 19(a), SCRCrimP (stating the grant of a defense motion for directed verdict of acquittal is proper only "if there is a failure of competent evidence tending to prove the charge"); State v. Venters, 300 S.C. 260, 264, 387 S.E.2d 270, 272-73 (1990) (requiring an appellate court reviewing a denial of a motion for a directed verdict to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State; finding submission to the jury proper if any evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, reasonably tends to prove the guilt of the accused; and holding a trial court considering a motion for directed verdict is concerned only with the existence of evidence, not with its weight); State v. Mitchell, 341 S.C. 406, 409, 535 S.E.2d 126, 127 (2000) (necessitating submission of the case to the jury if "any substantial evidence" has been presented that reasonably tends to prove the defendant's guilt or from which his guilt may be fairly and logically deduced). 

AFFIRMED.

PIEPER and GEATHERS, JJ., and CURETON, A.J., concur. 


[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.

[2] We decline to address Gilliam's argument that his two prior convictions should be considered as one.  This issue is unpreserved because Gilliam did not raise this issue to the trial court.  See State v. Hamilton, 333 S.C. 642, 651, 511 S.E.2d 94, 98 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding issues not raised to and ruled on by the circuit court may not be raised for the first time on appeal).