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2010-UP-308 - State v. Jenkins

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Wayne Jenkins, Appellant.


Appeal From Hampton County
 Perry M. Buckner, Circuit Court Judge


Unpublished Opinion No. 2010-UP-308
Submitted June 1, 2010 – Filed June 10, 2010


AFFIRMED


Deputy Chief Appellate Defender Wanda H. Carter, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General Julie M. Thames, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Isaac McDuffie Stone, III, of Bluffton, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Wayne Jenkins appeals his conviction for second-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor.  On appeal, Jenkins argues the trial court erred in finding the rape shield statute barred Jenkins from presenting evidence of the victim's prior false allegations of sexual assault. We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities:  S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-659.1(1) (2003) ("Evidence of specific instances of the victim's sexual conduct, opinion evidence of the victim's sexual conduct, and reputation evidence of the victim's sexual conduct is not admissible in prosecutions . . . ."); State v. Boiter, 302 S.C. 381, 383, 396 S.E.2d 364, 365 (1990) ("Although the Confrontation Clause 'tips the scales' in favor of permitting cross-examination if it could reasonably be expected to have an effect on the jury, a court may prohibit cross-examination for impeachment purposes when the probative value of the evidence that the defendant seeks to elicit is substantially outweighed by the risk of prejudice."); State v. McLeod, 362 S.C. 73, 79, 606 S.E.2d 215, 218 (Ct. App. 2004) ("The admission or exclusion of evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge."); Id. at 82, 606 S.E.2d at 220 ("Error is harmless where it could not reasonably have affected the result of the trial.").

AFFIRMED.

HUFF, SHORT, and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur.


[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.