THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
The State, Respondent,
Christopher Antangelo Robinson, Appellant.
Appeal From York County
John C. Hayes, III, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2010-UP-324
Submitted June 1, 2010 – June 23, 2010
Appellate Defender M. Celia Robinson, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General Julie M. Thames, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Kevin Scott Brackett, of York, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Christopher Antangelo Robinson was convicted of possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute and possession of marijuana. He appeals, arguing the circuit court erred in refusing to charge the jury on the law of inconsistent prior statements. Due to the State's violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Rule 5(a)(1)(C), SCRCrimP, Robinson contends the circuit court erred in denying his motions (1) to exclude testimony concerning money found on Robinson at the time of his arrest; (2) to instruct the jury to disregard the testimony concerning the money in deliberations; and (3) for mistrial. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities:
1. As to whether the circuit court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the law of prior inconsistent statements: State v. Gaines, 380 S.C. 23, 31, 667 S.E.2d 728, 732 (2008) ("To warrant reversal, a trial court's refusal to give a requested jury charge must be both erroneous and prejudicial to the defendant."); State v. Cole, 338 S.C. 97, 101, 525 S.E.2d 511, 512 (2000) ("The law to be charged must be determined from the evidence presented at trial."); State v. Commander, 384 S.C. 66, 75, 681 S.E.2d 31, 36 (Ct. App. 2009) (stating "an instruction should not be given unless justified by the evidence").
2. As to whether the State violated Brady such that the circuit court erred in denying Robinson's motions (1) to exclude testimony concerning money found on Robinson at the time of his arrest; (2) to instruct the jury to disregard the testimony in deliberations; and (3) for mistrial: S.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. S.E.C.U.R.E. Underwriters Risk Retention Group, 347 S.C. 333, 343, 554 S.E.2d 870, 875 (Ct. App. 2001) ("An issue must be raised and ruled upon by the trial court for an appellate court to review the issue.").
3. As to whether the State violated Rule 5(a)(1)(C), SCRCrimP, such that the circuit court erred in denying Robinson's motions (1) to exclude testimony concerning money found on Robinson at the time of his arrest; (2) to instruct the jury to disregard the testimony in deliberations; and (3) for mistrial: Rule 5(a)(1)(A), (B), (C), SCRCrimP (providing criminal defendants are entitled to their statements, criminal records, and any documents or tangible objects material to the preparation of their defense or intended for use by the prosecution); State v. Kennerly, 331 S.C. 442, 453, 503 S.E.2d 214, 220 (Ct. App. 1998) ("The definition of 'material' for purposes of Rule 5 is the same as the definition used in the Brady context."); id. (stating that under Brady "evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different").
KONDUROS, GEATHERS, and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.
 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.