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2010-UP-336 - In the Interest of Tremaine H.

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

In The Interest of Tremaine H., A Juvenile Under The Age Of Seventeen, Appellant.


Appeal From Georgetown County
R. Wright Turbeville, Family Court Judge


Unpublished Opinion No. 2010-UP-336
Submitted June 1, 2010 – Filed June 29, 2010   


AFFIRMED


Deputy Chief Appellate Defender Wanda H. Carter, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, Assistant Attorney General Deborah R. J. Shupe, all of Columbia; and Solicitor John Gregory Hembree, of Conway, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Tremaine H. appeals being adjudicated delinquent for second-degree lynching, arguing the family court erred in refusing to direct a verdict in his favor on the charge because the State failed to prove the acts of violence emanated from a premeditated purpose or intent.  We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities:  S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-220 (2003) (defining second-degree lynching as an act of violence inflicted by a mob upon an individual not resulting in the individual's death); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-230 (2003) (defining mob "as the assemblage of two or more persons, without color or authority of law, for the premeditated purpose and with the premeditated intent of committing an act of violence upon the person of another"); State v. Frazier, 386 S.C. 526, 531, 689 S.E.2d 610, 613 (2010) (providing when reviewing the denial of a directed verdict motion, the appellate court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the State and finding the denial of a directed verdict motion is proper when any direct evidence or substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused exists); State v. Smith, 352 S.C. 133, 137-38, 572 S.E.2d 473, 475-76 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding the State must produce some evidence of premeditated intent to sustain a conviction for lynching, premeditation cannot be spontaneous, and the State can establish the intent element of lynching through positive testimonial evidence or circumstantial inferences).

AFFIRMED.

KONDUROS, GEATHERS, and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.


[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.