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2010-UP-370 - State v. Black

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Jason Ervin Black, Appellant.


Appeal From Pickens County
John C. Few, Circuit Court Judge


Unpublished Opinion No. 2010-UP-370
Heard April 13, 2010 – Filed July 19, 2010


AFFIRMED


Senior Appellate Defender Joseph L. Savitz, III, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General Michelle J. Parsons, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Robert Mills Ariail, of Greenville, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Jason Ervin Black was convicted of criminal sexual conduct (CSC) with a minor in the first degree and lewd act upon a minor.  Black received twenty years' imprisonment for CSC and fifteen years' imprisonment for the lewd act offense, to run concurrently.  On appeal, Black argues the trial court erred in allowing the State to impeach Black's corroborating witness with two manslaughter convictions over ten years old.  We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: Rule 609(a)(1), SCRE (allowing, for impeachment purposes, admission of evidence that a witness other than an accused has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment in excess of one year, but with the proviso that such evidence may be excluded under Rule 403, SCRE); Rule 609(b), SCRE (prohibiting the admission of evidence of a conviction to impeach a witness if more than ten years has elapsed since the later of the date of the conviction or the date of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction "unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect"); State v. Colf, 337 S.C. 622, 629, 525 S.E.2d 246, 249 (2000) ("The balancing test required by Rule 609(b) must be conducted by the trial court."); State v. Smith, 337 S.C. 27, 33-34, 522 S.E.2d 598, 601 (1999) (upholding the disclosure to the jury of the defendant's prior domestic violence conviction in a trial on charges of murder and assault and battery with intent to kill, concluding the probative value of the prior conviction was not outweighed by unfair prejudice and the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting it).

AFFIRMED. 

HUFF, WILLIAMS, and THOMAS, JJ., concur.