THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
The State, Respondent,
Jerry L. Rosemond, Appellant.
Appeal From Greenville County
D. Garrison Hill, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2010-UP-375
Submitted June 1, 2010 – Filed July 27, 2010
Appellate Defender Robert M. Pachak, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Senior Assistant Attorney General Harold M. Coombs, Jr., all of Columbia; Solicitor Robert M. Arial, of Greenville, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Jerry L. Rosemond appeals his conviction for strong arm robbery, arguing the trial court erred in admitting hearsay testimony regarding his identity into evidence. We affirm.
At trial, a police officer who participated in the search for the robber stated an elderly woman at the residence where the robbery occurred identified Rosemond as the man who matched the description of the robber. Rosemond contends this statement constitutes inadmissible hearsay. The State argues the statement was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, but was offered to explain how the police officer was conducting her investigation. However, even assuming the statement was hearsay, its admission by the trial court was harmless. See State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 288, 625 S.E.2d 641, 646 (2006) ("The improper admission of hearsay is reversible error only when the admission causes prejudice."). The admission of the hearsay statement in this case was harmless because it was cumulative to other similar testimony offered without objection. See State v. Good, 308 S.C. 308, 311, 417 S.E.2d 640, 642 (Ct. App. 1992). Here, the first police officer testified she believed her conversation with the elderly woman was included in the report on the robbery. Additionally, a second police officer testified, without objection, that he received a report in which Rosemond was identified as the primary suspect in the robbery. Moreover, the admission of the statement was harmless because it could not have reasonably affected the outcome of the trial. See State v. Mitchell, 286 S.C. 572, 573, 336 S.E.2d 150, 151 (1985). There was ample evidence from which the jury could have found Rosemond guilty. The victim identified Rosemond without hesitation in the photographic lineup and at trial. Further, the second police officer testified Rosemond's voice matched a description of the robber's voice, and Rosemond lived at the residence where the robbery occurred. Accordingly, the trial court did not commit reversible error in admitting the hearsay statement.
FEW, C.J., THOMAS, and PIEPER, JJ., concur.
 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.