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2010-UP-382 - Sheep Island Plantation v. Bar-Pen Investments

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Sheep Island Plantation, LLC, Appellant,

v.

Bar-Pen Investments, LLC, Respondent.


Appeal From Berkeley County
Thomas L. Hughston, Jr., Circuit Court Judge


Unpublished Opinion No. 2010-UP-382
Submitted June 1, 2010 – Filed August 4, 2010   


REVERSED AND REMANDED


Stephen V. Futeral and Thomas C. Nelson, of Mt. Pleasant, for Appellant.

Charles S. Altman and William L. Howard, Sr., of Charleston, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: This case is decided pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.  Sheep Island Plantation, LLC contends that the trial court erred in granting a directed verdict on Sheep Island's breach of contract claim against Bar-Pen Investments, LLC.  We reverse and remand.

Bar-Pen argues that this appeal should be dismissed because Sheep Island's Rule 59 motion was untimely.  The trial court granted a directed verdict on March 13, 2008, but the clerk of court did not send Sheep Island written notice of the entry of judgment.  Sheep Island filed a Rule 59(e) motion on March 31, 2008.  Because Sheep Island never received written notice of the entry of judgment, the time for appeal did not begin to run until the trial court denied Sheep Island's Rule 59(e) motion on May 8, 2008.  See Rule 59(f), SCRCP ("The time for appeal of all parties shall be stayed by a timely motion under [Rule 59] and shall run from the receipt of written notice of entry of the order granting or denying such motions.").  Thus, Sheep Island timely served notice of its intent to appeal on May 15, 2008. 

After a careful review of the trial transcript and exhibits in the light most favorable to Sheep Island, we find some evidence to support Sheep Island's breach of contract claim.  In particular, the evidence supports more than one inference regarding whether the Paragraph 33 extension clause is invoked automatically, or whether notice is required.  Further, evidence exists to support an inference that the letter of termination Bar-Pen sent to Sheep Island on July 31, 2006, constitutes a repudiation.  In light of this evidence, the trial court should have denied Bar-Pen's motion for directed verdict.  See Sabb v. S.C. State Univ., 350 S.C. 416, 427, 567 S.E.2d 231, 236 (2002) (holding that a trial court must deny a directed verdict motion "when the evidence yields more than one inference or its inference is in doubt.").

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

FEW, C.J., THOMAS and PIEPER, JJ., concur.