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2010-UP-450 - Riley v. Osmose Holdings

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Clyde L. Riley, Jr., and Chere J. Riley, Appellants,

v.

Osmose Holdings, Inc., d/b/a Osmose, Inc.; Arch Wood Protection, Inc.; Chemical Specialties, Inc.; Cox Industries, Inc.; Buck Lumber and Building Supply, Inc., d/b/a Charleston Wood Industries; New South Wood Preserving, LLC; Collum's Lumber Products LLC; Spartanburg Forest Products, Inc.; East Coast Lumber Company, Inc.; Georgia-Pacific Corporation; Southern Lumber & Millwork Corp.; Hughes Lumber & Building Supply; G.S. Carter & Son Lumber Company; Lowe's Companies; 84 Lumber Company, Defendants,

of whom Buck Lumber and Building Supply, Inc. is, Respondent.


Appeal From Charleston County
Thomas A. Russo, Circuit Court Judge


Unpublished Opinion No. 2010-UP-450
Submitted October 1, 2010 – Filed October 19, 2010   


AFFIRMED


William K. Austin, of Charleston, South Carolina; Davis S. McCrea, of Bloomington, Indiana, for Appellant.

Morgan S. Templeton, of Charleston, South Carolina, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Clyde L. Riley, Jr. and Chere J. Riley (the Rileys) appeal the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Buck Lumber & Building Supply, Inc. d/b/a Charleston Wood Industries (Buck Lumber). The Rileys argue the circuit court erred in finding: (1) the Rileys abandoned their two causes of action for breach of warranty; and (2) the Rileys' claims were barred by the statute of limitations. 

We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: S.C. Code Ann. § 36-2-725 (2003) (stating a cause of action for breach of warranty has a statute of limitations of six years and begins running when "the breach is or should have been discovered") (emphasis added); Rule 40(j), SCRCP ("A party may strike its complaint . . . from any docket one time as a matter of right, provided that all parties adverse to that claim . . . agree in writing that it may be stricken, and all further agree that if the claim is restored upon motion made within 1 year of the date stricken, the statute of limitations shall be tolled as to all consenting parties during the time the case is stricken . . . ."); Maxwell v. Genez, 356 S.C. 617, 620-21, 591 S.E.2d 26, 28 (2003) ("Rule 40(j) does not require that a party move to restore the case to the docket within one year after it was stricken.  Instead, the unambiguous language provides that, if the claim is restored within one year after it is stricken, the statute of limitations is tolled for that period."); Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (stating an "appellate court need not address remaining issues when disposition of prior issue is dispositive").     

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS, PIEPER, and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.


[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.