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2010-UP-464 - State v. Evans

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Jeffrey S. Evans, Appellant.


Appeal From Anderson County
 Alexander S. Macaulay, Circuit Court Judge


Unpublished Opinion No. 2010-UP-464
Submitted October 1, 2010 – Filed October 25, 2010   


AFFIRMED


Appellate Defender LaNelle C. DuRant, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General Julie M. Thames, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Christina T. Adams, of Anderson, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Jeffrey S. Evans appeals his convictions for armed robbery and possession of a knife during the commission of a violent offense.  On appeal, Evans argues the trial court erred in denying his motions for a mistrial and directed verdict.  We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: 

1.  As to whether the trial court erred in denying Evans's motion for a mistrial:  State v. Culbreath, 377 S.C. 326, 331, 659 S.E.2d 268, 271 (Ct. App. 2008) ("Whether to grant or deny a mistrial motion is a matter within the trial court's sound discretion, and the court's decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion amounting to an error of law. . . .  In order to receive a mistrial, a defendant must show error and resulting prejudice.").

2.  As to whether the trial court erred in denying Evans's motion for a directed verdict: S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-330(A) (2003) (stating armed robbery occurs when a person commits robbery while armed with a deadly weapon);  State v. Moore, 374 S.C. 468, 476, 649 S.E.2d 84, 88 (Ct. App. 2007) ("Robbery is defined as the felonious or unlawful taking of money, goods, or other personal property of any value from the person of another or in his presence by violence or by putting such person in fear."); Id. at 474, 649 S.E.2d at 86 ("The appellate court may reverse the trial [court]'s denial of a motion for a directed verdict only if there is no evidence to support the [trial court's] ruling."); Id. at 474, 649 S.E.2d at 87 ("A case should be submitted to the jury if there is any direct evidence or any substantial circumstantial evidence that reasonably tends to prove the guilt of the accused or from which guilt may be fairly and logically deduced."). 

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS, PIEPER, and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.


[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.