THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
The State, Respondent,
Douglas Lamar Williams, Appellant.
Appeal From Spartanburg County
Ralph F. Cothran, Jr., Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2010-UP-498
Submitted November 1,2010 – Filed November 8, 2010
Appellate Defender Elizabeth A. Franklin-Best, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General Christina Catoe, of Columbia; and Solicitor Harold W. Gowdy, III, of Spartanburg, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Douglas Lamar Williams appeals his forgery conviction, arguing the trial court erred in admitting testimony identifying him as the individual who presented a forged check. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Pagan, 369 S.C. 201, 208, 631 S.E.2d 262, 265 (2006) (holding the admissibility of evidence is within the trial court's discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion, and noting an abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's ruling lacks evidentiary support or is controlled by an error of law); State v. Moore, 343 S.C. 282, 286, 540 S.E.2d 445, 447 (2000) ("An in-court identification of an accused is inadmissible if a suggestive out-of-court identification procedure created a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification."); Id. (holding the trial court need only consider the second prong if the identification process was suggestive); State v. Turner, 373 S.C. 121, 127, 644 S.E.2d 693, 696 (2007) (stating even assuming an identification procedure was suggestive, the identification need not be excluded if under all of the circumstances it was nevertheless reliable); Moore, 343 S.C. at 287, 540 S.E.2d at 447 (stating a two-step procedure is followed when evaluating an out-of-court identification: (1) whether the identification process unduly suggestive; and (2) if so, "whether the out-of-court identification was nevertheless so reliable that no substantial likelihood of misidentification existed" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
HUFF, KONDUROS, and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.