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2010-UP-503 - State v. McLaughlin

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Wayne McLaughlin, Appellant.


Appeal From Marion County
Howard P. King, Circuit Court Judge


Unpublished Opinion No. 2010-UP-503
Submitted October 1, 2010 – Filed November 12, 2010   


AFFIRMED


Deputy Chief Appellate Defender Wanda H. Carter, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General Christina J. Catoe, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Edgar L. Clements, III, of Florence, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Wayne McLaughlin was convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base and possession with intent to distribute cocaine and was sentenced to two concurrent terms of twenty-five years.  McLaughlin appeals, asserting the trial judge erred in (1) admitting incriminating evidence at trial based on the arresting officer’s failure to advise him of his Miranda[1] rights, and (2) refusing to remove and replace a sleeping juror.  We affirm[2] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: 

1. As to whether the trial judge erred by admitting incriminating evidence at trial when the arresting officer failed to advise McLaughlin of his Miranda rights while he was in police custody:  State v. Forrester, 343 S.C. 637, 642, 541 S.E.2d 837, 840 (2001) (noting that, generally, a motion in limine is not a final determination and a contemporaneous objection must be made when the evidence is introduced at trial, unless the ruling on the motion in limine is made immediately prior to the introduction of the evidence in question);  Doe v. U.S., 487 U.S. 201, 211 (1988) (providing, “[i]t is the extortion of information from the accused, the attempt to force him to disclose the contents of his own mind, that implicates the Self-Incrimination Clause”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted);  Id. at 210 n. 9 (implying that being forced to surrender a key to a strongbox containing incriminating documents would not amount to testimonial communication).

2.  As to whether the trial judge erred in refusing to remove and replace a sleeping juror:  State v. Smith, 338 S.C. 66, 74, 525 S.E.2d 263, 267 (Ct. App. 1999) (noting a showing of prejudice must be made to warrant relief in juror misconduct cases); Id. at 73, 525 S.E.2d at 266-67 (finding where the trial judge concluded the juror was awake and listening with her eyes closed, the trial judge made the requisite factual finding regarding whether the juror was asleep and need take no further action); Id. at 75, 525 S.E.2d at 268 (holding, because defendant bore the burden to show the juror was actually asleep, failure to request direct examination of the juror waived any complaint on appeal).

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., and HUFF and GEATHERS, JJ., confirm.


[1] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

[2] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.