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2010-UP-504 - Paul v. SCDOT

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Ronald I. Paul, Appellant,

v.

South Carolina Department of Transportation; Paul D. de Holczer, Individually and as a Partner of the Law Firm of Moses Koon & Brackett, PC; G.L. Buckles, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Keith J. Buckles and G.L. Buckles; Michael H. Quinn, Individually and as Senior Lawyer of Quinn Law Firm, LLC; J. Charles Ormond, Jr., Individually, and as a partner of the Law Firm of Holler, Dennis, Corbett, Ormond, Plante & Garner, Respondents.


Appeal From Richland County
Joseph M. Strickland, Special Circuit Court Judge


Unpublished Opinion No. 2010-UP-504
Submitted November 1, 2010 – Filed November 19, 2010   


AFFIRMED


Ronald I. Paul, pro se, of Columbia, for Appellant.

B. Michael Brackett, J. Charles Ormond, Jr., Mark Weston Hardee, Michael H. Quinn, Sr., and Natalie J. Moore, all of Columbia, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: Ronald I. Paul appeals the order of the circuit court granting the Respondents' motion to dismiss arguing the circuit court erred in (1) finding the statute of limitations barred his cause of action for civil conspiracy; (2) finding his complaint failed to state a cause of action for civil conspiracy; (3) finding he was attempting to litigate claims previously litigated in a previous suit between the same parties; (4) failing to consider his motion to strike; and (5) not considering his motion for summary judgment.  We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities:   

1. As to whether the circuit court erred in determining the statute of limitations barred Paul's claim for civil conspiracy: S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-530 (5) (2005) (providing the statute of limitations for an action sounding in tort is three years); Gibson v. Bank of Am. N.A., 383 S.C. 399, 406, 680 S.E.2d 778, 782 (Ct. App. 2009) ("The standard as to when the limitations period begins to run is objective rather than subjective. Therefore, the limitations period 'begins to run when a person could or should have known, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, that a cause of action might exist in his or her favor, rather than when a person obtains actual knowledge of either the potential claim or of the facts giving rise thereto.'" (emphasis omitted)).

2. As to the remaining issues: Rule 220(b)(2), SCACR ("The Court of Appeals need not address a point which is manifestly without merit.").

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., HUFF, J., and CURETON, A.J., concur.


[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.