THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Leon Chisolm, James Roosevelt Chisolm, Doris G. Fladger, Robert Chisolm, Florence Chisolm, Alice C. Jenkins, Sadie Y. McDonald, Martha Pryor, Patricia Millian, Margaret E. Warren, Andrew K. Chisolm, Edrina L. Wilson, Carl Chisolm, Lawrence Chisolm, Roosevelt Chisolm, II, Louis Chisolm, Eddie Chisolm, Leroy Chisolm, and Tommy Chisolm; Plaintiffs,
Of Whom Leon Chisolm, James Roosevelt Chisolm, Robert Chisolm, Florence Chisolm, Alice C. Jenkins, Sadie Y. McDonald, Martha Pryor, Patricia Millian, Margaret E. Warren, Andrew K. Chisolm, Edrina L. Wilson, Carl Chisolm, Lawrence Chisolm, Roosevelt Chisolm, II, Louis Chisolm, Eddie Chisolm, Leroy Chisolm, and Tommy Chisolm are Appellants,
Mary Frances S. Chisolm, William Chisolm, Emily C. Campbell, Debra C. Murphy, Allie C. Frazier, Cora C. Brown, Cordell Chisolm, Charles Chisolm, Jr., Phillip Chisolm, Anthony Chisolm, David Chisolm, Leonard Chisolm, and Levy Chisolm, Respondents.
Appeal From Charleston County
Mikell R. Scarborough, Master-in-Equity
Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-011
Submitted January 1, 2011 – Filed January 24, 2011
DISMISSED AND REMANDED
Barry I. Baker and Harold Alan Oberman, both of Charleston, for Appellants.
Willie Bruce Heyward, of N. Charleston, for Respondents.
PER CURIAM: Leon Chisolm et al. (Appellants) appeal the order of the master-in-equity denying Appellants' request to issue a deed to a parcel of property in accordance with an order from 1982. On appeal, Appellants argue: (1) the failure of the master-in-equity to issue a deed pursuant to the 1982 order is a clerical mistake pursuant to Rule 60(a), SCRCP, correctable at any time by the court and (2) the master-in-equity erred in dismissing Appellants' case before hearing the motion to set aside the entry of default made by Mary Frances S. Chisolm et al. (Respondents).
We decline to reach the merits of this appeal and find this matter to be premature. Due to the unusual posture of this case and the fact that the record does not indicate that a ruling has been made on Respondents' motion to set aside the entry of default, we dismiss this appeal as interlocutory. See S.C. Code Ann. § 14-3-330(1) (1977) (stating "no appeal [may] be taken until final judgment is entered"); Ex parte Wilson, 367 S.C. 7, 12, 625 S.E.2d 205, 208 (2005) ("As a general rule, only final judgments are appealable . . . . Any judgment or decree, leaving some further act to be done by the court before the rights of the parties are determined, is interlocutory and not final.") (internal citation omitted). In the current posture of this case, while Appellants did not prevail on the merits of their motions, default has nonetheless been entered in their favor, which is inconsistent with the denial of relief in their motions. Accordingly, we cannot address the merits raised on the summary denial of a Rule 59(e) motion.
We therefore dismiss the appeal and remand the case to the master-in-equity to rule on Respondents' motion to set aside the entry of default and to conduct such other proceedings as may be necessary to enter final judgment.
THOMAS, PIEPER, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.
 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
 We note Appellants specifically asked the master-in-equity to address the issue of the pending motion to set aside the entry of default but the master-in-equity failed to act.