THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Greenwood Beach Associates, Appellant,
Charleston County Assessor, Respondent.
Appeal From Administrative Law Court
Marvin F. Kittrell, Chief Administrative Law Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-084
Submitted February 1, 2011 – Filed February 24, 2011
Watson Lee Dorn, of Greenwood, for Appellant.
Joseph Dawson, III, Bernard E. Ferrara, Jr., and Austin A. Bruner, all of N. Charleston, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: This appeal arises out of the finding by the Administrative Law Court (ALC) after a contested case hearing that Appellant Greenwood Beach Associates is not entitled to a school board operating tax credit for tax year 2007. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-610(B)(e) (Supp. 2010) (stating the court of appeals may affirm the ALC if the decision is supported by substantial evidence on the whole record); S.C. Code Ann. § 11-11-156(C) (Supp. 2007) ("Revenues received by the county must be used to provide a property tax credit against the property tax liability for county operations on owner-occupied residential property classified for property tax purposes pursuant to Section 12-43-220(c)."); S.C. Code Ann. § 12-43-220(c)(2)(i) (Supp. 2010) ("To qualify for the special property tax assessment ratio allowed by this item, the owner-occupant must have actually owned and occupied the residence as his legal residence and been domiciled at that address for some period during the applicable tax year."); S.C. Code Ann. § 12-43-220(c)(3) (Supp. 2010) ("[A] taxpayer may apply for a refund of property taxes overpaid because the property was eligible for the legal residence assessment ratio. . . . The taxpayer must establish that the property in question was in fact his legal residence and where he was domiciled."); S.C. Code Ann. § 7-1-25(A) (Supp. 2010) (noting that a person's residence is his or her domicile and a person can have only one domicile, which is a fixed home where he or she has an intention to return when absent).
HUFF, SHORT, and PIEPER, JJ., concur.
 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.