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2011-UP-098 - Mohammad v. Spencer Real Estate

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Karen D. Mohammad, Respondent,

v.

Spencer Real Estate Investments, Inc., Appellant.


Appeal From Aiken County
Robert A. Smoak, Jr., Circuit Court Judge


Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-098
Submitted March 1, 2011 – Filed March 14, 2011


AFFIRMED


Brian Austin Katonak, of Aiken, for Appellant.

Scott William Patterson, of Aiken, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Spencer Real Estate Investments, Inc. appeals the master-in-equity's grant of a directed verdict, arguing the master erred in: (1) allowing Ian Davis to be dismissed pursuant to Rule 41 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure and (2) not allowing Davis to seek a continuance on behalf of Spencer Real Estate in order to obtain counsel for Spencer Real Estate.  Spencer Real Estate also argues the master violated their due process rights by dismissing Davis from the action. We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1.  As to whether the master erred in allowing Davis to be dismissed pursuant to Rule 41, SCRCP:  Rule 4(a), SCRCP (stating a civil action is commenced when the summons and complaint is filed and served on the opposing party); Estate of Corley, 299 S.C. 525, 527, 386 S.E.2d 264, 266 (Ct. App. 1989) (holding it is not error for a trial court to dismiss an action which was never properly instituted).   

2.  As to whether the master erred in not allowing Davis to seek a continuance on behalf of Spencer Real Estate:  Renaissance Enters.,  Inc. v. Summit Teleservices,  Inc.,  334 S.C. 649, 651, 515 S.E.2d 257, 258 (1999) ("[A] non-lawyer cannot represent a corporation in circuit or appellate courts.").

3.  As to whether the dismissal of Davis violated Spencer Real Estate's due process rights: Tall Tower, Inc. v. S. C. Procurement Review Panel,  294 S.C. 225, 233, 363 S.E.2d 683, 687 (1988) ("A demonstration of substantial prejudice is required to establish a due process claim."). 

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS, GEATHERS, and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.


[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.