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2011-UP-185 - State v. Brown

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals


The State, Respondent,

v.

David Lee Brown, Appellant.


Appeal From Charleston County
  Deadra L. Jefferson, Circuit Court Judge


Unpublished Opinion No.   2011-UP-185
Heard April 7, 2011 – Filed April 25, 2011


AFFIRMED


 

Appellate Defender Robert M. Pachak, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley Elliott, Senior Assistant Attorney General Harold M. Coombs, Jr., all of Columbia; and Solicitor Scarlett Anne Wilson, of Charleston, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Appellant David Lee Brown appeals his convictions for armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime.  On appeal, Brown argues the trial court erred in failing to exclude evidence seized after the detention of a vehicle without reasonable suspicion.[1]  We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:  Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., Humboldt Cnty., 542 U.S. 177, 185 (2004) ("In the ordinary course a police officer is free to ask a person for identification without implicating the Fourth Amendment."); id. ("[A] law enforcement officer's reasonable suspicion that a person may be involved in criminal activity permits the officer to stop the person for a brief time and take additional steps to investigate further."); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 129 n.3 (2000) ("A shrewd man sees trouble coming and lies low. . . ."); U.S. v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985) (noting the ability of the police to briefly stop a person suspected of involvement in a past crime, ask questions, or check identification in the absence of probable cause promotes the strong government interest in solving crimes and bringing offenders to justice); U.S. v. Quarles, 330 F.3d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding law enforcement officials may detain a defendant upon reasonable suspicion that the person they encountered was involved in or wanted in connection with a completed felony); State v. Blassingame, 338 S.C. 240, 248, 525 S.E.2d 535, 539 (Ct. App. 1999) ("The term 'reasonable suspicion' requires a particularized and objective basis that would lead one to suspect another of criminal activity."); id. ("In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, the whole picture must be considered."). 

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., and HUFF and PIEPER, JJ., concur.


[1] At oral arguments, counsel confirmed our reading of the appellant’s brief that Brown only challenges the initial acts of Officer Bonanni in requesting the driver’s license and parking behind the driver’s vehicle.  Brown does not challenge the actions of any of the other officers.