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2011-UP-217 - State v. Sanders

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Lavar Patrick Sanders, Appellant.


Appeal From Sumter County
R. Ferrell Cothran, Jr., Circuit Court Judge


Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-217  
Submitted May 1, 2011 – Filed May 17, 2011


AFFIRMED


Chief Appellate Defender Robert M. Dudek, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan M. Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General David Spencer, all of Columbia; and Cecil Kelly Jackson, of Sumter, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Lavar Patrick Sanders appeals his conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine within one-half mile of a park.  He argues the trial court erred in charging the jury on the statutory inference regarding intent to distribute because the trial court failed to use specific language instructing the jury that it was free to accept or reject the inference.  We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Simmons, 384 S.C. 145, 178, 682 S.E.2d 19, 36 (Ct. App. 2009) ("A jury charge is correct if, when the charge is read as a whole, it contains the correct definition and adequately covers the law." (citation omitted)); State v. Adkins, 353 S.C. 312, 318-19, 577 S.E.2d 460, 464 (Ct. App. 2003) ("The substance of the law is what must be charged to the jury, not any particular verbiage." (citations omitted)); see also State v. Gathers, 295 S.C. 476, 481, 369 S.E.2d 140, 143 (1998) (holding that a defendant's argument that an instruction on the inference of implied malice was not "burden shifting" because "[n]owhere in the charge does the judge mention the need for rebuttal or explanation of the evidence presented by the State" and "the judge's charge comports with the requirement that it is for the jury to determine from all the evidence whether or not malice is proven" (citation omitted)).

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., HUFF and THOMAS, JJ. concur.


[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.