Supreme Court Seal
South Carolina
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Site Map | Feedback
2011-UP-218 - Squires v. SLED

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Charles Rodney Squires, Appellant,

v.

South Carolina Law Enforcement Division, Respondent.


Appeal From Horry County
J. Michael Baxley, Circuit Court Judge


Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-218
Submitted May 1, 2011 – Filed May 17, 2011


AFFIRMED


William B. Von Herrmann, of Conway, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan M. Wilson, Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Attorney General David A. Spencer, and Assistant Attorney General Geoffrey K. Chambers, all of Columbia, for Respondent.


PER CURIAM: Charles Rodney Squires appeals the trial court's order requiring him to register as a sex offender.  He argues the trial court erred because (1) the South Carolina Code pardons him "from all the legal consequences of his crime and of his conviction"; (2) the registration requirement deprives him of the fundamental fairness required by due process; and (3) the doctrine of laches estopped the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) from enforcing the registration requirement against him.  We affirm[1] pursuant to rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to whether the South Carolina Code pardons Squires from the registration requirement: State v. Taub, 336 S.C. 310, 317, 519 S.E.2d 797, 801 (Ct. App. 1999) ("The general rule of statutory construction is that a specific statute prevails over a more general one." (citation omitted)); see also S.C. Code Ann. § 23-3-430(E)-(F) (2007 & Supp. 2010) (requiring re-registration as a sex-offender where the offender's guilty plea was not "reversed, overturned, or vacated on appeal" or the offender's pardon failed to specifically state the pardon was "based on a finding of not guilty").

2.  As to whether the registration requirement deprives Squires of the fundamental fairness required by due process: Sloan v. S.C. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 370 S.C. 452, 484-85, 636 S.E.2d 598, 615 (2006) (providing that the requirements of fundamental fairness are "usually deemed to apply in a contested case or hearing which affects an individual's property or liberty interest . . . ."); Hendrix v. Taylor, 353 S.C. 542, 552, 579 S.E.2d 320, 325 (2003) (holding that a sex-offender's due process challenge to sex-offender registration failed because the sex-offender failed to "first 'show that he has a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest'" affected by the registration requirement (citation omitted)).

3. As to whether the doctrine of laches estopped SLED from enforcing the registration requirement against Squires: Rule 210(h), SCACR ("The appellate court will not consider any fact which does not appear in the Record on Appeal."); Whitehead v. State, 352 S.C. 215, 219, 574 S.E.2d 200, 202 (2002) (providing that laches is not available as a defense where the party asserting the defense fails to establish "the delay has worked injury, prejudice, or disadvantage" against her) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., HUFF and THOMAS, JJ., concur.


[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.