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2011-UP-297 - State v. Peake

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Tijuan Peake, Appellant.


Appeal From Union County
John C. Hayes, III, Circuit Court Judge


Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-297 
Submitted June 1, 2011 – Filed June 14, 2011


AFFIRMED


Appellate Defender M. Celia Robinson, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan M. Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General Julie M. Thames, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Kevin S. Brackett, of York, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Tijuan Peake appeals his convictions for distribution of crack cocaine and distribution of crack cocaine in proximity of a school.  Peake argues the trial court erred in the following: (1) admitting tax maps into evidence because they constituted inadmissible hearsay; and (2) refusing to charge the jury on the law of entrapment.  We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: 

1.  As to whether the trial court erred in allowing the tax maps into evidence:  S.C. State Highway Dep't v. Wilson, 254 S.C. 360, 369, 175 S.E.2d 391, 396 (1970) ("[T]he admission or exclusion of evidence is a matter which is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge and . . . in the absence of a clear abuse of such discretion, amounting to an error of law, his ruling will not be disturbed."); S.C. Code Ann. § 19-5-510 (1985) ("A record of an act, condition or event shall, insofar as relevant, be competent evidence if the custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its identity and the mode of its preparation, and if it was made in the regular course of business, at or near the time of the act, condition or event and if, in the opinion of the court, the sources of information, method and time of preparation were such as to justify its admission."); Rule 803(6), SCRE ("A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, . . . made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.").

2. As to whether the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury on the law of entrapment:  State v. Johnson, 295 S.C. 215, 217, 367 S.E.2d 700, 701 (1988) ("It is a well settled principle of law that the defense of entrapment is not available to a defendant exhibiting a predisposition to commit a crime independent of governmental inducement and influence."); State v. Brown, 362 S.C. 258, 261-62, 607 S.E.2d 93, 95 (Ct. App. 2004) ("The law to be charged to the jury is determined by the evidence presented at trial."). 

AFFIRMED.

SHORT, KONDUROS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.


[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.