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2011-UP-407 - State v. Bledsoe

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

James E. Bledsoe, Appellant.


Appeal From Lexington County
R. Knox McMahon, Circuit Court Judge


Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-407
Submitted August 15, 2011 - Filed August 29, 2011 


AFFIRMED


Appellate Defender Kathrine H. Hudgins, of Columbia, for Appellant.

J. Benjamin Aplin, of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: James E. Bledsoe appeals the circuit court's order finding Bledsoe violated the conditions of his community supervision, revoking his community supervision, and ordering him to remain under G.P.S. monitoring.  Bledsoe argues the circuit court abused its discretion in revoking his community supervision for unintentional violations and by ordering electronic monitoring for ten years even though he only had 275 days remaining of community supervision.  We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: S.C. Code Ann. § 23-3-540(D) (Supp. 2010) ("A person who is required to register pursuant to this article for [second-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor], and who violates a term of . . . a community supervision program, may be ordered by the court or agency with jurisdiction to be monitored by the Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services with an active electronic monitoring device."); § 23-3-540(H) (Supp. 2010) ("The person shall be monitored by the Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services with an active electronic monitoring device for the duration of the time the person is required to remain on the sex offender registry pursuant to the provisions of this article, unless the person is committed to the custody of the State. Ten years from the date the person begins to be electronically monitored, the person may petition the chief administrative judge of the general sessions court for the county in which the person was ordered to be electronically monitored for an order to be released from the electronic monitoring requirements of this section."); State v. Garrard, 390 S.C. 146, 151, 700 S.E.2d 269, 272 (Ct. App. 2010) ("Both the decision of whether an alleged violation was willful and the decision of whether to revoke community supervision are discretionary. The [circuit] court will not be reversed unless the appellant has shown an abuse of that discretion. Where there is any evidence to support the court's factual findings, there is no abuse of discretion.").

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., THOMAS and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.


[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.