THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
The State, Respondent,
Vashaun Ravenel, Appellant.
Appeal From Charleston County
Roger M. Young, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-425
Submitted September 1, 2011 – Filed September 20, 2011
Deputy Chief Appellate Defender Wanda H. Carter, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General Harold M. Coombs, Jr., all of Columbia; and Solicitor Scarlett Anne Wilson, of Charleston, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Vashaun Ravenel appeals his conviction for attempted armed robbery, arguing the circuit court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict because the State failed to present sufficient evidence he intended to rob his victim. We affirm.
An appellate court reviews the denial of a directed verdict by viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the State. State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292, 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006). If any direct evidence or substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tends to prove the guilt of the accused, an appellate court must find the case was properly submitted to the jury. Id. at 292-93, 625 S.E.2d at 648. The circuit court may not consider the weight of the evidence. Id. at 292, 625 S.E.2d at 648. "Attempt crimes are generally ones of specific intent such that the act constituting the attempt must be done with the intent to commit that particular crime." State v. Nesbitt, 346 S.C. 226, 231, 550 S.E.2d 864, 866 (Ct. App. 2001). "Intent is seldom susceptible to proof by direct evidence and must ordinarily be proven by circumstantial evidence, that is, by facts and circumstances from which intent may be inferred." State v. Tuckness, 257 S.C. 295, 299, 185 S.E.2d 607, 608 (1971).
Here, Ravenel's victim testified that Ravenel wore both a ski mask and a hooded sweatshirt at night, presented a firearm, and tried to open the victim's car door twice. We find this testimony was substantial circumstantial evidence when, in a light most favorable to the State, the jury could reasonably infer that Ravenel was guilty of attempted armed robbery. Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is
FEW, C.J., and THOMAS and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.