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2011-UP-438 - Carroll v. Johnson

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Leila Miriam Carroll, Appellant,

v.

Travis Oliver Johnson and Alan Travis Johnson d/b/a Sonrise Planters, Respondents.


Appeal From Horry County
 Steven H. John, Circuit Court Judge


Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-438
Submitted October 1, 2011 – Filed October 11, 2011


AFFIRMED


Leila Miriam Carroll, pro se, of Waxhaw.

John M. Leiter, of Myrtle Beach, for Respondents. 

PER CURIAM: Leila Miriam Carroll appeals the trial court's dismissal of her claims for waste and fraud against Alan Johnson and Travis Oliver Johnson, arguing the trial court (1) violated her due process rights by considering the Johnsons' standing argument and (2) erred in finding Carroll lacked standing.   We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1.  As to whether the trial court violated Carroll's due process rights by considering the Johnsons' standing argument: Wilder Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998) ("It is axiomatic that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial [court] to be preserved for appellate review.").

2.  As to whether the trial court erred in finding Carroll lacked standing to bring the waste and fraud causes of action: S.C. Code Ann. § 62-3-703(a) (Supp. 2010) ("A personal representative has a duty to settle and distribute the estate of the decedent . . . ."); S.C. Code Ann. § 62-3-715(20) (2009) ("[A] personal representative, acting reasonably for the benefit of the interested persons, may properly . . . prosecute or defend claims, or proceedings in any jurisdiction for the protection of the estate . . . ."); Powell ex rel. Kelley v. Bank of Am., 379 S.C. 437, 444, 665 S.E.2d 237, 241 (Ct. App. 2008) ("Standing refers to a party's right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right. It concerns an individual's sufficient interest in the outcome of the litigation to warrant consideration of [the person's] position by a court.") (citations and quotation marks omitted); id. at 445, 665 S.E.2d at 241 ("One must be a real party in interest, i.e., a party who has a real, material, or substantial interest in the subject matter of the action, as opposed to one who has only a nominal or technical interest in the action."); id. at 444, 665 S.E.2d at 241 (providing standing is comprised of three elements:  (1) plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact"; (2) a causal connection exists between the injury and the conduct complained of;  and (3) it is likely the injury will be "redressed by a favorable decision"); Judy v. Judy, 393 S.C. 160, __ , 712 S.E.2d 408, 411 (2011) ("At common law, waste is any permanent injury to lands, houses, gardens, trees, or other corporeal hereditaments done or permitted by the tenant of an estate less than a fee to the prejudice of him in reversion or remainder. Waste may be committed by acts or omissions which tend to the lasting destruction, deterioration, or material alteration of the freehold and the improvements thereto or which diminish the permanent value of the inheritance.") (citations and quotation marks omitted).

AFFIRMED.

SHORT, WILLIAMS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.


[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.