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2011-UP-558 - State v. Williams

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Tawanda Williams, Appellant.


Appeal From Horry County
Larry B. Hyman, Jr., Circuit Court Judge


Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-558
Submitted December 1, 2011 – Filed December 9, 2011
Withdrawn, Substituted, and Refiled April 18, 2012  


AFFIRMED


Appellate Defender Kathrine H. Hudgins, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant  Attorney General Christina J. Catoe, all of Columbia; and Solicitor J. Gregory Hembree, of Conway, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Tawanda Williams appeals her conviction for distribution of cocaine.  Williams argues the trial court erred in denying her motion for a continuance.  We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. McKennedy, 348 S.C. 270, 280, 559 S.E.2d 850, 855 (2002) (holding a trial court's denial of a motion for a continuance "will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion" (quoting State v. Williams, 321 S.C. 455, 459, 469 S.E.2d 49, 51 (1996))); id. at 280, 559 S.E.2d at 855 ("This [c]ourt has repeatedly upheld denials of motions for continuances where there is no showing that any other evidence on behalf of the defendant could have been introduced, or that any other points could have been raised, if more time had been granted to prepare for trial."); Rule 7(a), SCRCrimP (providing a trial court may only grant a continuance upon "written request by counsel"); Rule 7(b), SCRCrimP ("No motion for continuance of trial shall be granted on account of the absence of a witness without the oath of the party, his counsel, or agent to the following effect: the testimony of the witness is material to the support of the action or defense of the party moving; the motion is not intended for delay, but is made solely because he cannot go safely to trial without such testimony; and has made use of due diligence to procure the testimony of the witness or of such other circumstances as will satisfy the court that his motion is not intended for delay.");Rule 7(b)(2), SCRCrimP (requiring the moving party to set forth under oath what "fact or facts he believes the witness if present would testify to and the grounds for such belief"); see State v. Richardson, 253 S.C. 468, 473-74, 171 S.E.2d 717, 719 (1969) (supporting the proposition that the Confrontation Clause is not implicated merely because the State did not call the informant to testify); id. ("[T]he State is not required to place upon the stand every witness who has knowledge of material facts connected with the crime charged."); id. at 474, 171 S.E.2d at 720 (holding the rules of evidence "do not require that all witnesses who may be present when the offense was committed, or who may be supposed to possess information respecting it, should be produced").

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., and THOMAS and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.


[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.