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2011-UP-572 - State v. Welch

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent

v.

Reico Lamar Welch, Appellant.


Appeal From York County
 Larry B. Hyman, Jr., Circuit Court Judge


Unpublished Opinion No.  2011-UP-572
Heard December 6, 2011 – Filed December 20, 2011 


AFFIRMED


Appellate Defender Elizabeth Franklin-Best, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, Assistant Attorney General David Spencer, all of Columbia; Solicitor Kevin Brackett, of York, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Reico Welch appeals his conviction for first-degree burglary, arguing the circuit court improperly considered three prior out-of-state offenses for breaking and entering that were consolidated into a single judgment against him.  Welch claims the circuit court impermissibly considered this single judgment as three convictions, which resulted in an improperly enhanced charge of first-degree burglary. 

We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities:  S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-311 (2003) (stating a person is guilty of first-degree burglary "if the person enters a dwelling without consent and with intent to commit a crime in the dwelling, and . . . the burglary is committed by a person with a prior record of two or more convictions for burglary or housebreaking or a combination of both . . . .") (emphasis added); N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A-1340.15(b) (2009) ("If an offender is convicted of more than one offense at the same time, the court may consolidate the offenses for judgment and impose a single judgment for the consolidated offenses.") (emphasis added); State v. Miller, 341 S.E.2d 531, 538 (N.C. 1986) (discussing the benefits of consolidating plea bargains for judgment and stating "the very purpose of consolidation for sentencing purposes is to . . . benefit [] the defendant by limiting the maximum sentence that he can receive for all of the convictions so consolidated");  see also Mid-State Auto Auction of Lexington, Inc. v. Altman, 324 S.C. 65, 69, 476 S.E.2d 690, 692 (1996) ("Unless there is something in the statute requiring a different interpretation, the words used in a statute must be given their ordinary meaning."); State v. Landis, 362 S.C. 97, 102, 606 S.E.2d 503, 505 (Ct. App. 2004) (finding the legislature's intent should be ascertained primarily from the plain language of the statute).

AFFIRMED.

SHORT, WILLIAMS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.