THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
In The Interest of Zakei H., A Juvenile Under The Age of Seventeen, Appellant.
Appeal From Charleston County
Judy L. McMahon, Family Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-580
Submitted December 1, 2011 – Filed December 20, 2011
Appellate Defender M. Celia Robinson, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General Mark R. Farthing, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Scarlett A. Wilson, of Charleston, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Zakei H. appeals the family court's order imposing restitution in the amount of $587.00 as a condition of his probation resulting from his delinquency adjudication arising from his admission of possession of stolen property. Zakei H. was arrested and ultimately adjudicated delinquent after being found in possession of a damaged moped that had been stolen the previous day. Zakei H. argues the family court erred in (1) imposing restitution as a condition of his probation, (2) admitting a repair estimate submitted by the victim for his damaged moped, and (3) ordering restitution in the amount of $587.00. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities:
1. As to whether the family court erred in imposing restitution as a condition of Zakei H.'s probation based upon his conviction of possession of stolen property: S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-7805(A)(3) (current version at S.C. Code Ann. § 63-19-1410(A)(3) (2010)) (providing for the imposition of restitution as a condition of probation in juvenile delinquency cases); In re Terrence M., 368 S.C. 276, 277, 628 S.E.2d 295, 296 (Ct. App. 2006) (imposing restitution as a condition of probation in a possession of stolen property case involving a juvenile).
2. As to whether the family court erred in admitting a repair estimate proffered by the victim substantiating the amount of damage done to the stolen moped: State v. Gulledge, 326 S.C. 220, 228, 487 S.E.2d 590, 594 (1997) (stating that in determining the appropriate amount of restitution, evidentiary rules do not apply, and the "court may conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information it may consider or the source from which the information may come, to assist it in determining the amount of restitution to be imposed"); id. at 229, 487 S.E.2d at 594 (noting that although evidentiary rules do not apply to sentencing hearings, "the admissibility of evidence is limited by constitutional provisions which require the evidence to be relevant, reliable and trustworthy"); Rule 1101(d)(3), SCRE (stating the rules of evidence do not apply to "dispositional hearings in juvenile delinquency matters").
3. As to whether the family court erred in ordering restitution in the amount of $587.00: Gulledge, 326 S.C. at 228, 487 S.E.2d at 594 ("The restitution hearing is part of the sentencing proceeding."); Brooks v. State, 325 S.C. 269, 271, 481 S.E.2d 712, 713 (1997) ("A [sentencing court] is allowed broad discretion in sentencing within statutory limits."); In re M.B.H., 387 S.C. 323, 326, 692 S.E.2d 541, 542 (2010) ("A sentence will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion when the ruling is based on an error of law or a factual conclusion without evidentiary support."); S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-7805(A)(3) (current version at S.C. Code Ann. § 63-19-1410(A)(3) (2010)) (requiring the family court when "considering the appropriate amount of monetary restitution to be ordered" to "establish the monetary loss suffered by the victim and then weigh and consider this amount against the number of individuals involved in causing the monetary loss, the child's particular role in causing this loss, and the child's ability to pay the amount over a reasonable period of time").
SHORT, WILLIAMS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.
 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.