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2012-MO-016 - State v. Fastiggi

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Supreme Court

The State, Respondent,

v.

Sara Nicette Fastiggi, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2011-190091


Appeal from Berkeley County

Kristi Lea Harrington, Circuit Court Judge


Memorandum Opinion No. 2012-MO-016

Heard May 2, 2012 – Filed May 23, 2012


AFFIRMED


Grover C. Seaton, III of Seaton Law Firm, LLC, of Moncks Corner, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh , Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, Senior Assistant Attorney General Harold M. Coombs, Jr. all of Columbia, and Solicitor Scarlett Anne Wilson, of Charleston, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:   This is a direct appeal challenging the trial court's denial of a motion to suppress.  We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities:  State v. Banda, 371 S.C. 245, 251, 639 S.E.2d 36, 39 (2006) ("Our review in Fourth Amendment search and seizure cases is limited to determining whether any evidence supports the trial court's finding."); State v. Brockman, 339 S.C. 57, 64-65, 528 S.E.2d 661, 664-64 (2000) (holding that on appeal from a motion to suppress based on Fourth Amendment grounds, an appellate court will apply a deferential standard of review); State v. Pichardo, 367 S.C. 84, 95, 623 S.E.2d 840, 846 (Ct. App. 2005) ("The 'clear error' standard means that an appellate court will not reverse a trial court's finding of fact simply because it would have decided the case differently."); see also Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 334 (2009) ("An officer's inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop, [the United States Supreme] Court has made plain, do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop."); State v. Provet, 391 S.C. 494, 499, 706 S.E.2d 513, 516 (Ct. App. 2011) (holding "the Fourth Amendment does not per se prohibit questions unrelated to the purpose of the traffic stop unless the unrelated questions unreasonably extend the traffic stop's duration").

AFFIRMED.

TOAL, C.J., PLEICONES, BEATTY, KITTREDGE and HEARN, JJ., concur.