THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Nellie Ellison, Individually and as Guardian ad Litem for Kashawn R., Keshawn R., and Kevin R., Appellants,
Rudolph Brown, Respondent.
Appeal From Marion County
Michael G. Nettles, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-174
Heard February 15, 2012 – Filed March 14, 2012
H. Thad White, Jr., of Florence, for Appellants.
R. Hawthorne Barrett, of Columbia; and R. Heath Atkinson, of Florence, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Nellie Ellison, individually and as Guardian ad Litem for Kashawn R., Keshawn R., and Kevin R. (collectively, Appellants) appeal a jury verdict finding Rudolph Brown not liable for injuries they sustained when their car was rear-ended by Mr. Brown's car. Appellants raise two arguments on appeal. We affirm.
1. Appellants argue the trial court erred in permitting the reading and admission of Dr. T. Rhett Spencer, Jr.'s deposition because Dr. Spencer's testimony failed to satisfy the "most probably" rule. However, Appellants objected only after subsequent questioning and the conclusion of direct examination. Therefore, this issue is unpreserved. See Lindsey v. City of Greenville, 247 S.C. 232, 240-41, 146 S.E.2d 863, 868 (1966) (holding the trial court properly overruled an objection for failure to be timely raised because it challenged testimony introduced during direct examination and was not raised until after the expert's direct examination had concluded); Holroyd v. Requa, 361 S.C. 43, 60, 603 S.E.2d 417, 426 (Ct. App. 2004) (cert. granted) ("Failure to object to the introduction of evidence at the time the evidence is offered constitutes a waiver of the right to have the issue considered on appeal.").
2. Appellants argue the trial court erred in denying their motion for a new trial based upon certain assertions made during Mr. Brown's closing argument. However, Appellants did not object during any portion of Mr. Brown's closing argument. Moreover, their post-trial motion only challenged the assertions that Mr. Brown's estate and widow would pay the jury's verdict, and these assertions do not constitute abuse of a party or witness. Therefore, this issue is unpreserved. See Dial v. Niggel Assocs., Inc., 333 S.C. 253, 256-57, 509 S.E.2d 269, 270-71 (1998) (providing that the failure to make a contemporaneous objection to an improper closing argument waives any challenge to the argument unless the closing argument "constitutes abuse of a party or witness" and the complained of argument was raised by post-trial motion).
WILLIAMS, THOMAS, and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.