THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
The State, Respondent,
Adrian Eaglin, Appellant.
Appeal From Lexington County
R. Knox McMahon, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-218
Heard February 13, 2012 – Filed April 4, 2012
REVERSED AND REMANDED
Appellate Defender Dayne C. Phillips and Appellate Defender M. Celia Robinson, both of Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, Assistant Attorney General Mark R. Farthing, all of Columbia, and Solicitor Donald V. Myers, of Lexington, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Adrian Eaglin appeals his sentences for two counts of assaulting a correctional officer. Eaglin argues the trial court should have sentenced him to concurrent instead of consecutive sentences. We reverse and remand for resentencing.
Eaglin assaulted two correctional officers while awaiting trial in the Lexington County jail. At the time of his convictions for the assaults, he was still awaiting trial and not serving an active sentence. Section 16-3-630 of the South Carolina Code (2003) states that a sentence imposed for a conviction for assaulting a correctional officer "must be served consecutively to any other sentence the person is serving." During sentencing, the trial judge stated the statute meant Eaglin's assault sentences had "to run consecutive to each other or consecutive to his active sentence, which he doesn't have one." When the judge later announced the consecutive sentences, he did not indicate whether he based that decision on section 16-3-630 or on his discretionary power to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences. See Major v. S.C. Dep't of Prob., Parole & Pardon Servs., 384 S.C. 457, 465-66, 682 S.E.2d 795, 799-800 (2009) (stating "a court's final judgment in a criminal case is the pronouncement of the sentence which includes the ability to designate whether sentences run concurrent or consecutive, subject to statutory restrictions").
The court could have imposed the consecutive sentences based on its interpretation of section 16-3-630 or based on its view of the facts of the case. § 16-3-630 (stating a person convicted of assaulting a correctional officer "must serve a mandatory minimum sentence of not less than six months nor more than five years"). While we disagree with the trial court that it was required to issue consecutive sentences under section 16-3-630, we cannot tell whether the consecutive sentences were imposed based on the statute or on the judge's discretionary sentencing power, regardless of the statute. Therefore, we reverse and remand for resentencing.
FEW, C.J., and HUFF and SHORT, JJ., concur.
 Section 16-3-630 was repealed by 2010 Act No. 273 § 7.A on June 2, 2010.