THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
The State, Respondent,
David Cortez Carson, Appellant.
Appeal From Spartanburg County
E. C. Burnett, III, Special Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-243
Submitted April 2, 2012 – Filed April 25, 2012
Appellate Defender Elizabeth A. Franklin-Best, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, and Assistant Attorney General J. Anthony Mabry, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Barry J. Barnette, of Spartanburg, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: David Cortez Carson appeals his conviction of murder, arguing the circuit court erred in failing to declare a mistrial when the State introduced improper character evidence. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142, 587 S.E.2d 691, 693-94 (2003) ("In order for an issue to be preserved for appellate review, it must have been raised to and ruled upon by the [circuit court]. Issues not raised and ruled upon in the [circuit] court will not be considered on appeal."); In re Walter M., 386 S.C. 387, 392, 688 S.E.2d 133, 136 (Ct. App. 2009) ("Arguments raised for the first time on appeal are not preserved for our review."); State v. Moyd, 321 S.C. 256, 263, 468 S.E.2d 7, 11 (Ct. App. 1996) (stating if the objecting party accepts the ruling of the circuit court and does not contemporaneously object to the sufficiency of the curative instruction or move for a mistrial, any error is deemed cured and the issue is not preserved for appellate review).
PIEPER, KONDUROS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.
 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
 Even if we were to find the issue preserved, we would affirm. See State v. Faulkner, 274 S.C. 619, 621, 266 S.E.2d 420, 421 (1980) (noting that although the State may not attack a criminal defendant's character unless he or she places it in issue, relevant evidence properly admissible for other purposes need not be excluded merely because it incidentally reflects on his or her character).