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2012-UP-303 - State v. Pringle

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Donovan Raheam Pringle, Appellant.


Appeal From Georgetown County
Benjamin H. Culbertson, Circuit Court Judge


Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-303
Submitted April 2, 2012 – Filed May 16, 2012   


AFFIRMED


Appellate Defender Elizabeth A. Franklin-Best, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General Christina J. Catoe, all of Columbia; and Solicitor J. Gregory Hembree, of Conway, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Donovan Raheam Pringle appeals his convictions of armed robbery and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime.  He argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict because the State's evidence amounted only to a mere suspicion he was involved in the armed robbery.  Because Pringle's cousin stated to the police he committed the robbery with Pringle and his statement was corroborated by circumstantial evidence, we affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292, 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006) ("When ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court is concerned with the existence or nonexistence of evidence, not its weight."); id. at 292-93, 625 S.E.2d at 648 (stating an appellate court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the State when reviewing a denial of a directed verdict and must find the case was properly submitted to the jury if any direct evidence or any substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tends to prove the guilt of the accused); State v. Crawford, 362 S.C. 627, 634, 608 S.E.2d 886, 889-90 (Ct. App. 2005) ("[T]estimony of prior inconsistent statements may be used as substantive evidence when the declarant testifies at trial and is subject to cross examination." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); State v. Needs, 333 S.C. 134, 144, 508 S.E.2d 857, 862 (1998) ("[T]he jury is the judge of which contradictory statement of the witness is the truth." (quotation marks and citation omitted)); State v. Pitts, 256 S.C. 420, 426, 182 S.E.2d 738, 741 (1971) ("The weight to be attached to the testimony of an accomplice is for the jury alone who must consider it in view of the other evidence and reach their conclusion on the view of the whole case.").

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., HUFF and SHORT, JJ., concur.


[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.