THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Southern Bank, Appellant,
Leeroy Bruce Jr., Franklin Harold Mishoe, and SRP Federal Credit Union, Respondents.
Appeal From Edgefield County
William P. Keesley, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-304
Submitted May 1, 2012 – Filed May 16, 2012
Michael S. Medlock, of Edgefield, for Appellant.
James S. Murray, of Augusta, and Franklin H. Mishoe, pro se, of North Augusta, for Respondents.
PER CURIAM: Southern Bank (Bank) appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of SRP Federal Credit Union (Union), arguing the trial court erred in finding that Bank's security interest became subordinate to Union's security interest in a 1964 Chevrolet Malibu pursuant to section 36-9-337 of the South Carolina Code (2003). We affirm.
"An appellate court reviews the grant of summary judgment under the same standard applied by the [trial] court." Harbit v. City of Charleston, 382 S.C. 383, 389, 675 S.E.2d 776, 779 (Ct. App. 2009). The trial court should grant summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c), SCRCP. "In determining whether any triable issues of fact exist, the evidence and all reasonable inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Harbit, 382 S.C. at 389-90, 675 S.E.2d at 779.
Section 36-9-337 of the South Carolina Code (2003) provides:
If, while a security interest in goods is perfected by any method under the law of another jurisdiction, this [s]tate issues a certificate of title that does not show that the goods are subject to the security interest or contain a statement that they may be subject to security interests not shown on the certificate:
. . .
(2) the security interest is subordinate to a conflicting security interest in the goods that attaches, and is perfected under [s]ection 36-9-311(b), after issuance of the certificate and without the conflicting secured party's knowledge of the security interest.
Here, Union presented evidence it acquired and perfected its security interest in the car without knowledge of Bank's claimed security interest in the car in its verified pleadings and at the motion hearing. While Bank argues Union had knowledge of Bank's security interest, Bank presented no evidence in its pleadings, affidavits, or exhibits nor made any arguments at the motion hearing to support such contention. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted Union's motion for summary judgment because there was no genuine issue of material fact whether Union knew or had reason to know about Bank's security interest.
WILLIAMS, THOMAS, and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.
 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.